Vanderbilt University Law School

Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

2016

The New Antitrust Federalism
Rebecca Haw Allensworth

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, and the State and Local Government Law
Commons
Recommended Citation
Rebecca Haw Allensworth, The New Antitrust Federalism, 102 Virginia Law Review. 1387 (2016)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications/15

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact
mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

+(,121/,1(
Citation: 102 Va. L. Rev. 1387 2016
Provided by:
Vanderbilt University Law School

Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline
Fri Oct 28 09:57:34 2016
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from
uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
of your HeinOnline license, please use:
Copyright Information

VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 102

OCTOBER

2016

NUMBER 6

ARTICLES
THE NEW ANTITRUST FEDERALISM
Rebecca Haw Allensworth*
"Antitrustfederalism," or the rule that state regulation is not subject
to federal antitrust law, does as much as-andperhaps more than-its
constitutional cousin to insulate state regulationfrom wholesale invalidation by thefederal government. For most of the last century, the Court
quietly tinkered away with the contours of this federalism, struggling to
draw a formal boundary between state action (immune from antitrust
suits) and private cartels (not). But with the Court's last three antitrust
cases, the tinkering has given way to reformation. What used to be a
doctrine with deep roots in constitutionalfederalism is now a doctrine
with close ties to the federal administrative state where courts sit in
judgment of an agency's decision-makingprocedure.
The new antitrustfederalism conditions antitrust immunity not on the
fact of state regulation but on the process of that regulation. Now, only
regulation created by a politically accountable process is beyond the
reach offederal antitrustsuits, exposing vast areas of state regulation to
new antitrustscrutiny. This Article argues that the new antitrustfederalism is an improvement on the old, both because the old boundary model
was unworkable and because the new regime addresses the "inherent
capture" problems at the heart of modern state regulation. But this Article also warns that ifthe Court does not give accountability review real
bite, it may have to abandon the new antitrustfederalism and opt for a

* Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School; J.D., Harvard Law School; M.Phil,
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nuclear option that could portend the end of antitrustfederalism altogether.
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INTRODUCTION

IN just three relatively obscure antitrust cases,' the U.S. Supreme
.Court has quietly revolutionized how states and the federal government share power. These cases addressed a doctrine-unfamiliar to
those outside of the field of antitrust law-that grants "state action" immunity from federal antitrust liability2 and thus marks the thin line that
insulates state regulation from wholesale invalidation through federal
antitrust lawsuits.' For decades, the Court conceived of this line, and the
"antitrust federalism" it effected, as a formal question about where the
state ended and antitrust liability began. This was the old antitrust federalism: a boundary-drawing exercise that gave strong deference to state
regulation. The Court's state action revolution ushers in a new antitrust
federalism, one that all but dispenses with the notion of separate spheres
in favor of something less deferential to the states-procedural review of
state regulation.
Antitrust federalism may be less familiar than its constitutional
cousin, but it is just as important-if not more so-to the state-federal
balance of power. The Sherman Act forbids anticompetitive restraints of
trade and monopolization of markets, and it does not seem to limit these
prohibitions to private citizens and corporations. 4 Because regulation often tinkers with the free market economy and tends to create competitive
winners and losers, Sherman Act liability for state conduct would severely restrict a state's ability to regulate within its borders.' So when

1N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015) [hereinafter NC Dental]; FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1003 (2013); FTC v. Ticor Title Ins.
Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992).
2 See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943) (holding that the Sherman Act does
not apply to state activity). Parkerhas been credited with creating the "state-action antitrust
immunity" doctrine. See NC Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1107.

3 See Cmty. Commc'ns Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 64 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
4 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (2012).

5 See Cmty. Commc'ns Co., 455 U.S. at 64 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (explaining that "if
an adverse effect upon competition were enough to render a statute invalid under the Sherman Act," states would essentially be unable to regulate in the economic sphere (citing New
Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 111 (1978))); New Motor Vehi-

cle Bd., 439 U.S. at 109-11; Richard Squire, Antitrust and the Supremacy Clause, 59 Stan.
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the Court extended the reach of the Sherman Act-along with all federal
regulation passed under the Commerce Clause--during the New Deal,6
it became necessary to define an exemption for "state action" or risk the
demise of state regulatory autonomy altogether.
And state action im7
munity from the Sherman Act was bom.

For the remainder of the twentieth century, the Court struggled to define the boundaries of state activity immune from antitrust suit. In conceiving of the task as a perimeter-drawing exercise with a binary result-"inside" gets immunity, "outside" does not-it borrowed from
constitutional federalism's theory that the Constitution gives states the
right to regulate autonomously where the feds do not or cannot. This
boundary theory of antitrust federalism placed an emphasis on formalism in defining the state, and largely left up to the states themselves the
question of what "the state" is for purposes of antitrust immunity. But
the boundary method faltered, both because formal lines around state activity turned out to be unworkable, and because such deference to states
hobbled the Sherman Act and permitted extremely anticompetitive state
regulation.8 Cracks in the formalist foundation began to show in the
1980s, but the Court still struggled to preserve the paradigm of separate
federal and state turf.
Today, the Court has broken with the boundary model and crafted a
new antitrust federalism for the twenty-first century. The Court's last
three antitrust federalism cases have virtually abandoned formal definitions of "the state" and have adopted an accountability-based test for
whether state regulation enjoys immunity from federal antitrust law.9
The model for power sharing no longer comes from constitutional federalism, but from administrative law where courts use procedural review
to control agency decision making. As in administrative law, power
sharing means some deference; a federal court hearing an antitrust case

L. Rev. 77, 106 (2006) (explaining that "[s]tate laws that transfer wealth from consumers to
producers are ... extremely common").
6 See Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942) (extending the reach of the Commerce
Clause to intrastate activities that "affect" interstate commerce).
7 See Parker,317 U.S. at 350-51.
8 See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 361 (1977) (allowing a state bar association to ban price advertising for all lawyers, despite obvious anticompetitive effect, because the bar rules were technically approved by the state supreme court and so constituted
"state action").
9
NC Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1111; FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1003
(2013); FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992).
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will defer to a state's regulatory choices, but only where states adhere to
certain decision-making procedures. I call this mode of review "accountability review" because the procedures imposed by the Court are
designed to maximize states' exposure to political heat for the regulation's adverse effects on competition.
This Article argues that the Court's new antitrust federalism is an improvement upon the old. First, it is superior to the boundary model because boundaries proved unworkable and because the constitutional federalism model was an imperfect theoretical fit in the antitrust context.
Second, process review aimed at political accountability is a better tool
for curbing anticompetitive regulation without abrogating state autonomy. It promises to reduce states' reliance on the most competitively
risky kind of regulation-industry self-regulation-without secondguessing the regulation for which states take transparent political responsibility.
Its success, however, is not guaranteed. If accountability review fails,
the Court has intimated that it may be willing to face the specter of
Lochner v. New York1 ° and directly review the substance of anticompetitive state regulation. Much depends on how the Court fills in the most
important piece still missing from the antitrust federalism puzzle. The
Court's recent cases have held that regulation delegated to the industry
itself must be "'actively supervised' by the State"11 to enjoy immunity
from the Sherman Act,' 2 but the Court has not provided a concrete definition of active supervision. If the Court defines "active supervision" to
give accountability review real bite, then the new antitrust federalism
has a chance of survival. If not, the Court may find itself in the unenviable position of having to choose between accusations of Lochnerism and
letting the states trample federal antitrust policy at their discretion.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I identifies the old antitrust
federalism, from its inception in Parker v. Brown 13 to its crisis in Cali10198 U.S. 45 (1905).
11Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980)
(establishing a two-part test for state action immunity, the second prong requiring that the
challenged activity be "'actively supervised' by the State itself' (quoting City of Lafayette v.
La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978) (opinion of Brennan, J.))).
12 See NC Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1114 ("The Court holds today that a state board on which a
controlling number of decisionmakers are active market participants in the occupation the
board regulates must satisfy Midcal's active supervision requirement in order to invoke
state-action
antitrust immunity.").
13
Parker,317 U.S. 341.
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fornia Retail Liquor Dealers Ass 'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. 14 arguing
that in this era the Court-inspired by constitutional federalismattempted to draw formal boundaries around state activity. Part II presents the new antitrust federalism, as established in the Court's last three
state action immunity cases. Here I show that the cases' emphasis on
procedure and political accountability point towards new theoretical underpinnings for antitrust federalism, borrowed from federal administrative law. Part III defends the new antitrust federalism normatively, explaining that the old paradigm was flawed both practically and
theoretically, and that the new regime's focus on accountability and process addresses the capture problems that lead to extremely anticompetitive state regulation. Part III also addresses the possibility that the new
antitrust federalism is a step towards substantive federal review of state
regulation. Part IV pushes the analysis into the future, by providing the
most complete scholarly account to date of what "active supervision"
should mean. 5 It argues for a definition of "active supervision" that
helps accountability review deliver on its promise to balance state power
with federal competition policy. A short conclusion follows.
I. THE OLD ANTITRUST FEDERALISM

From its inception in 1943, antitrust federalism labored under a false
formalism that conceived of "the state" as having a discernable boundary. The old focus on boundaries was modeled on constitutional federal-

14Following Midcal, the Court decided nine cases in ten years attempting to define the
two-part test established in that case. See Ticor, 504 U.S. at 633; City of Columbia v. Omni
Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 378 (1991); Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 100-01
(1988); 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 343-45 (1987); Fisher v. City of Berkeley,
475 U.S. 260, 267-69 (1986); S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference v. United States, 471 U.S.
48, 59-60 (1985); Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 43-44 (1985); Hoover
v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 568-69 (1984); Cmty. Commc'ns Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S.
40, 51(1982).
15 The question of what "active supervision" means has received little scholarly attention.
Joshua Rosenstein treats the question in his Comment, Active Supervision of Health Care
Cooperative Ventures Seeking State Action Antitrust Immunity, 18 Seattle U. L. Rev. 329
(1995), but the analysis is specific to the health care context and predates the recent changes
in antitrust federalism jurisprudence. Michal Dlouhy makes an important contribution in a
student note, see Michal Dlouhy, Note, Judicial Review as Midcal Active Supervision: Immunizing Private Parties from Antitrust Liability, 57 Fordham L. Rev. 403 (1988), but the
piece only deals with one possible mode of supervision and is also out-of-date. To be sure,
the question is discussed in many antitrust federalism articles, but none with the depth of
treatment or specificity offered by this Article.
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ism, where states were seen as centers of decision making separate from
the federal government.
A. The Old Antitrust Federalism:DrawingBoundaries, Giving
Deference
It has been observed that the Sherman Act, the main federal statute
governing competition law,16 "cannot mean what it says."' 7 It makes all
"restraint[s] of trade" unlawful 8 and prohibits monopolization in any
form, without regard to who is restraining trade or conferring monopoly
power. 19 State regulation routinely restrains trade in ways that would run
afoul of the Sherman Act if performed by private parties.2 ° States fix
prices, 21 restrict competitive entry, 22 and even prohibit categories of
transactions. 23 And states regularly make monopolists out of market actors and otherwise insulate industries from competition. 24 If the Sherman
Act and the decades of case law interpreting it were applied against
these regulatory activities, they could obliterate state autonomy as we
know it. To avoid this backdoor to plenary federal power, the Court, in
1943, read into the statute an exception for "state action": States are
immune from antitrust suits challenging their regulatory activity as anticompetitive. 25 From its inception, and through most of the twentieth cen16 See Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law 33 (2d ed. 2001) (calling the Sherman Act "[t]he
basic federal antitrust law").
17 See Nat'l Soc'y of Prof 1 Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687 (1978) (observing
that the Sherman Act cannot actually mean that "'every' contract that restrains trade is unlawful").
18 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
19See id. §§ 1, 2.
20 See sources cited supra note 5.
21 States typically fix prices when they regulate utilities. See, e.g., Trigen-Okla. City Energy Corp. v. Okla. Gas & Elec. Co., 244 F.3d 1220, 1223 (10th Cir. 2001) (finding state action immunity for a state-regulated utility).
22 States control entry into many professions. See Aaron Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels by
Another Name: Should Licensed Occupations Face Antitrust Scrutiny?, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1093, 1112 (2014) (observing that "professional licensing can act as a barrier to entry into
the profession").
23 Arizona, for example, prohibits surrogacy contracts. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-218
(2015).
24
For example, in Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 45-46
(1982), the city of Boulder had prohibited a cable television provider from expanding its
business within the city and competing with existing providers.
25 See Parker,317 U.S. at 351 (finding that because there was "no hint that [the Sherman
Act] was intended to restrain state action or official action directed by a state," state action is
immune from federal antitrust suit).
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tury, state action immunity doctrine used formalism and deference to delineate federal from state regulatory power.
1. Parker: Origins of State Action Immunity
Although the Sherman Act was passed in 1890, it was not until the
New Deal era that any conflict between the statute and state regulation
arose. Until the Court interpreted the Commerce Clause to give Congress sweeping regulatory authority, it was unthinkable that a federal
statute such as the Sherman Act could apply to state regulation, which
was, by definition, formally intrastate. 26 But in 1942, the Court established the "affectation" doctrine in Wickard v. Filburn, vastly expanding
the reach of Congress's Commerce Clause power to include all commerce that had an effect (however small and indirect) on interstate
trade.27 Overnight, the boundaries of the Sherman Act grew to reach any
state regulation that had even a small effect on interstate trade.28
The following year, the Court decided Parker, creating immunity
from the Sherman Act for state regulatory activity. 29 The case presented
a Sherman Act challenge against a state-run output restriction on California's raisin producers. The program had the same effect on the market
as a cartel agreement and if created privately by the raisin farmers themselves, certainly would have run afoul of federal antitrust laws.3 ° The
Court assumed that under Wickard the raisin program "affected" inter-

26 See NC Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1118 (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting that until Wickard v.

Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), "the [Sherman] Act did not pose a threat to traditional state
regulatory activity"); Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26
J.L. & Econ. 23, 40-41 (1983) (noting that "few if any members [of Congress in 1890] rea-

sonably could have thought that the [Sherman Act] applied to any actions wholly within the
borders of a single state," and that "[t]he need for accommodation between state and federal
law arises only because the Sherman Act has grown with the growth of the commerce power2"317 U.S. at 124.
28 See NC Dental, 135 S.Ct. at 1118 (Alito, J., dissenting) ("The new interpretation of the

commerce power brought about an expansion of the reach of the Sherman Act."); Herbert
Hovenkamp, Federalism and Antitrust Reform, 40 U.S.F. L. Rev. 627, 629 (2006) (observing
that with Wickard, "significant conflict between federal antitrust and state regulation became

possible").

29 317 U.S. at 350-51.

30 Id. at 350 ("We may assume for present purposes that the California prorate program
would violate the Sherman Act if it were organized and made effective solely by virtue of a
contract, combination or conspiracy of private persons, individual or corporate.").
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state commerce and so was within the ambit of the Sherman Act,31 but it
explained that the Act could not be used to "restrain state action or official action directed by a state. 32 The Court grounded this new "state action immunity" in the text-or lack thereof--of
the Sherman Act, which
"makes no mention of the state as such., 33
This appeal to the text of the Sherman Act has made it common for
scholars and courts to justify state action immunity-sometimes called
Parker immunity-as giving effect to the original intent of the drafters
of the Sherman Act.34 But it is too much to say that the Congress that
passed the Sherman Act affimnatively intended to exempt state regulation from federal antitrust liability; the most that can be said is that Congress never considered the possibility at all.35 Parker, therefore, is better
understood as being more about the affectation doctrine than about the
intent behind or text of the Sherman Act. Federal antitrust liability for
state laws and regulations would so disrupt the state-federal balance of
power as it stood in the 1940s as to render the affectation doctrine ques-

31 Id. (assuming "that Congress could, in the exercise of its commerce power, prohibit a
state from maintaining a stabilization program like the present because of its effect on interstate commerce").
12 Id. at 351.
33 Id.
34 For cases grounding state action immunity in congressional intent, see Patrickv. Burget,
486 U.S. 94, 99 (1988) (explaining that Parkerheld that the Sherman Act was not "intended" to restrain states); Town ofHallie v. City of Eau Claire,471 U.S. 34, 38 (1985) (explaining that the Parker Court "refused to infer [a congressional] intent" to apply Sherman Act
liability to the states); Parker,317 U.S. at 351. For scholarship grounding Parkerimmunity
in congressional intent, see, e.g., Phillip Areeda, Antitrust Immunity for "State Action" After
Lafayette, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 435, 437 (1981) (explaining that in Parker"[t]he Supreme Court
found no Sherman Act language or legislative history to indicate a congressional intent to
control [the] behavior of a sovereign state"); Merrick B. Garland, Antitrust and State Action:
Economic Efficiency and the Political Process, 96 Yale L.J. 486, 488 (1987) (explaining that
Parkerimmunity is based on the fact that "Congress had not intended the Sherman Act to
bar states from imposing restraints on competition"); Milton Handler, The Current Attack on
the Parkerv. Brown State Action Doctrine, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 9 (1976) (explaining that
"Parkerspecifically held [that] the Congress that passed the Sherman Act never intended it
to apply at all to state action"). But see NC Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1119 (Alito, J., dissenting)
("The Court's holding in Parkerwas not based on either the language of the Sherman Act or
anything in the legislative history affirmatively showing that the Act was not meant to apply
to the States.").
35 NC Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1119 (Alito, J., dissenting) (explaining that "[flor the Congress
that enacted the Sherman Act in 1890, it would have been a truly radical and almost certainly
futile step to attempt to prevent the States from exercising their traditional regulatory authority" through Sherman Act liability).
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tionable under the federalist principles enshrined in the Constitution.3 6
Thus, to preserve the viability of Wickard, the Court created a compromise that would leave states a relatively free hand to regulate without
federal oversight, and Parker immunity was born.
Even from its inception, state action immunity was not complete. The
Parker Court held that states could not selectively repeal the Sherman
Act by sanctioning private cartels and other antitrust violations. The
Court explained that "a state does not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring
that their action is lawful."3 7 This caveat in Parker implied a difference
between genuine state regulation and mere rent dealing to private actors,
a distinction that would prove both essential to the Court's antitrust federalism doctrine and resistant to easy application. The ParkerCourt observed that because the raisin program was directed, not merely authorized, by the state, the raisin farmers and the members of the agricultural
commission responsible for the price fixing were immune.38 But Parker,
otherwise, provided no guidance on the line between directed and authorized Sherman Act violations.39
Parker's creation of state action immunity and its caveat that states
may not merely sanction private antitrust violations made it crucial to
distinguish state regulation from private anticompetitive conduct. Thus,
Parker gave rise to a question that would plague the Court for over seventy years in defining the contours of state action immunity and the balance between state and federal power to control competition: What is
"the state" for antitrust immunity purposes?

36The ParkerCourt acknowledged the threat that Wickard's affectation doctrine posed to
state sovereignty. Parker,317 U.S. at 359-60 ("The governments of the states are sovereign
within their territory ....This Court has repeatedly held that the grant of power to Congress
by the Commerce Clause did not wholly withdraw from the states the authority to regulate
the commerce with respect to matters of local concern."); cf. Easterbrook, supra note 26, at
24 (noting that if the Sherman Act were interpreted to preempt state laws inconsistent with
the Act's procompetitive principles, it would "doom all state regulation").
37
Parker,317 U.S. at 351.
38
Id.at 351-52.
39Nor did the Court provide any guidance on this question in its next state action immunity case, Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., which merely reiterated Parker's
holding that a state cannot immunize Sherman Act violations merely by authorizing them.
341 U.S. 384, 386 (1951) ("The fact that a state authorizes the price fixing does not, of
course, give immunity to the scheme, absent approval by Congress.").
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2. FormalistAttempts to Define the State
The Court's initial attempts to define "the state" were formalist, and
for some cases formal boundaries worked well. When, in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., a hardware store challenged a regulated electric utility's policy of including free light bulbs with electric service, the Court
40
resolved the state action question by examining the caption of the suit.
The named plaintiff was the private utility itself, not a state governmental body or official, and so, the Court held that Parker immunity did not
apply. 41 Similarly, in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,
the Court permitted a suit against a municipality, holding that a city is
not "the state" for immunity purposes.42
In other cases, formalism seemed to work less well to define the state.
In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, the Court confronted a Sherman Act
suit against a state bar association challenging its rule of ethics encouraging compliance with fee schedules as anticompetitive. 43 The case
turned on whether the Bar was a private professional organization or an
arm of the state, as the body responsible for licensing attorneys. The Bar
was a hybrid entity, comprised of private attorneys but endowed with
some governmental-like powers and responsibilities. 44 Without the possibility of resorting to formalist boundaries of "the state," the Court decided the Bar's status based on a kind of respondeat superior test: It
found that because the Supreme Court of Virginia had expressed skepticism towards fee schedules,4 5 the Bar was acting in a private capacity in
encouraging adherence to the schedules. 46 Two years later, in Bates v.

40Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 581-82, 591 (1976).

41 Id. at 591-92 ("In this case, unlike Parker, the only defendant is a private utility....
Since the case now before us does not call into question the legality of any act of the State of
Michigan or any of its officials or agents, it is not controlled by the Parkerdecision."). The
Court did consider whether the light bulb program was compelled by the state. The Court

answered this question in the negative, observing that because the light bulb program was
initiated by the utility, "the option to have, or not to have, such a program [was] primarily
respondent's, not the Commission's." Id. at 594.
42City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 408 (1978). The Court ex-

plained, after citing language from Parker, that "[c]ities are not themselves sovereign; they
do not receive all the federal deference of the States that create them." Id. at 412.
43Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 775 (1975).
44Id. at 790-91.

45The Virginia Supreme Court had "explicitly directed lawyers not 'to be controlled' by
fee schedules." Id. at 789.

46 The Court explained that while "the State Bar is a state agency for some limited purposes," when it promulgated the ethics rule it was acting as a co-conspirator in "what is essen-
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State Bar ofArizona, the Court implied that when a State Bar acts within
the scope of its authority under the state, it does enjoy state action immunity. 4
3. Cracks in the FormalistFoundation:Midcal's Two-Step

By the 1980s, it was clear that the Parkerdoctrine needed to evolve to
address the fact that much state regulation is conducted by hybrid entities like the Virginia State Bar, and not by sovereign branches of state
government. The Court attempted to provide clarity for hybrid entities in
Midcal, a case challenging a California statute obligating all wine
wholesalers to sell at prices set by wine producers. 48 The California statute required wine producers to file price schedules with the state, but the
state had "no direct control over wine prices, and it [did] not review the
reasonableness of the prices set by wine dealers. '4 9 The resale price
scheme would have violated the Sherman Act if all the parties involved
were private,5" but the wine producers defended the scheme by claiming
Parkerimmunity.
Rather than asking whether the defendant was an arm of the state, or
whether the state directed the challenged conduct, the Court created a
two-step test for antitrust immunity. The Court held that a restraint enjoys state action immunity if it is "clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed as state policy" and "'actively supervised' by the State itself."51 The Court found no state action immunity in Midcal because,
while the pricing scheme satisfied the first prong
of the new test, the
52
state did not adequately supervise the program.
tially a private anticompetitive activity," and so could be sued under the Sherman Act. Id. at
791-92.
47TheCourt in Bates did not explicitly decide the case on the respondeat superiortheory
advanced in Goldfarb, but rather held that the "real party in interest" was the Arizona Supreme Court, because while the Bar had proposed the restriction in question (an ethics rule
banning lawyer advertising), the Arizona Supreme Court had approved it. Bates v. State Bar
of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 361 (1977). But, one can square Bates (where the Court looked past
the Bar to the state supreme court) with Goldfarb (where the Court did not) by applying
Goldfarb's respondeatsuperior theory: Where a Bar acts under its authority, evidenced in
Bates by the supreme court's approval of the ethics rule, it enjoys state action immunity.
48 445 U.S. at 99.
41Id. at 100.
50 Id. at 102-03.
51Id. at 105 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S.
at 410).
52 Id. at 105-06.
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One of the benefits of Midcal's two-step test over the early formalist
attempts to identify the state was that it provided a way to categorize restraints created by sub-state entities like bar associations and municipalities. By the time of Midcal, it was relatively uncontroversial that restraints on trade created by the state "acting as sovereign, 53 such as
laws passed by a state legislature and rules promulgated by a state supreme court, were per se immune.5 4 But a significant amount of regulation was and is created by nonsovereign entities, and Midcal provided a
way to categorize these restraints as either private, and so subject to antitrust liability, or sufficiently tied to the state as to enjoy immunity.
In theory, Midcal could be seen as a move towards the procedural review that defines the new antitrust federalism. It essentially asked two
questions about how the challenged restraint was created: whether the
state had articulated a regulatory intent to abrogate competition and
whether the state supervised the restraint's creation and implementation.55 But subsequent cases interpreting Midcal failed to realize its potential to create meaningful procedural review. By returning to formalism in defining "clear articulation," and failing to define "active
supervision" at all, the Court largely retained the old boundary model
even after Midcal.
In Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, decided four years after
Midcal, the Court defined "clear articulation" broadly to include any
state mandate to regulate a particular area of economic activity.56 A state
statute authorizing cities to "provide sewage services and also to determine the areas to be served" contemplated anticompetitive conduct,
which was sufficient "clear articulation" of a state's intent to displace
competition with regulation. 7 Similarly, in Southern Motor Carriers
Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, the Court found "clear articulation" when a state "authorized, but [did] not compel[]," collective rate
" Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 790.
54See Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 567-68 (1984) ("[W]hen a state legislature adopts
legislation, its actions constitute those of the State and ipsofacto are exempt from the operation of the antitrust laws." (citation omitted)); Office of Policy Planning, FTC, Report of the
State Action Task Force 6 (2003) (noting that "actions of a state legislature and of a state
supreme court acting in a legislative fashion are those of the state acting as sovereign" (footnotes omitted)). Cf. Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 790-91 (explaining that if a Virginia statute or the
Virginia Supreme Court Rules "required the anticompetitive activities of either respondent,"
their actions would be immune).
s Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105.
U.S. 34, 45-46 (1985).
56471
57
Id.at 42.
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making among competitors.5 8 These cases evinced extreme deference to
states; only one case of this era found articulation lacking, and there the
statute that defendants claimed provided "clear articulation" said nothing
specific about regulation or competition. 9
As for the other Midcal prong, the Court also failed to actualize its
potential to create meaningful procedural review. The "active supervision" cases following Midcal provided little guidance about what steps
states must take in supervising regulation, instead merely highlighting
what is not active supervision. In Patrickv. Burget, the Court held that a
state-ordered peer review program of physicians was not actively supervised because the state could only overturn peer-review decisions for
procedural defects. 60 And even FTC v. Ticor Title Insurance Co., which
can be seen as the first case of the new era, defined active supervision in
the negative.6 1
Perhaps part of why the Court did not feel the need to precisely define
"active supervision" is that it created, just five years after Midcal, a
shortcut for some sub-state entities that allowed immunity even in the
absence of supervision. In Hallie, the Court held that municipalities need
not be supervised to enjoy immunity; "clear articulation" from the state
was enough. 62 The Court justified the shortcut for municipalities by reasoning that when a city restricts competition, "there is little or no danger
that it is involved in a private price-fixing arrangement., 63 It hinted that
other regulatory entities, perhaps "state agenc[ies]," would also be allowed to take the shortcut, but it expressly declined to extend its holding
beyond municipalities. 64 The creation of this shortcut, together with a
liberal interpretation of "clear articulation," marked a return to formalism and sweeping state deference, despite Midcal's apparent focus on
the process of state decision making.
58471 U.S. 48, 50 (1985).

59See Cmty. Commc'ns Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 43, 55 (1982) (holding that a
state's constitutional "home rule" amendment, granting cities "the full right of self-

government in both local and municipal matters," did not provide clear articulation of the
state's intent to displace competition (quoting Colo. Const. art. XX, § 6(h)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
60 486 U.S. 94, 102-03 (1988).
61504 U.S. 621, 638 (1992) (finding active supervision lacking because while the state had

the power to review the anticompetitive restriction in question, it did not exercise that power62 Hallie, 471
U.S. at 46-47.
63
Id. at 47.

64Id. at 46 n.10.
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B. The Old Model: FormalBoundaries and ConstitutionalFederalism
The theory behind this turf model--deferential and formalist-was
borrowed from constitutional federalism, where state regulatory autonomy is prized, even if the mechanisms defining and policing its boundaries are fraught. The connection between constitutional and antitrust federalism seems natural enough, since Parker itself was born out of a fear
that the affectation doctrine of Wickard would all but obliterate state
sovereignty if state regulation were placed within the reach of the Sherman Act. But it is not inevitable that antitrust and constitutional federalisms should rest on the same model of power sharing.
I use "constitutional federalism" to refer to the most common meaning of "federalism" outside of the antitrust context. It is the federalism
the Founders debated in the Federalist Papers and the theory of federalstate power balance that underlies many constitutional crises confronted
by the Supreme Court, beginning with McCulloch v. Maryland.65 Constitutional federalism refers to the principle that the United States is a
"they" and not an "it," a coalition of otherwise autonomous, selfgoverning states that have given their consent to be governed-in limited, enumerated ways-by a central government of their election.66
Constitutional federalism relies on the idea that separations of decision-making power-among the states and between the federal government and the states-will optimize law and policy in the United States.
The way that power is divided among the sovereigns, and the means of
maintaining those divisions, has changed dramatically in the last century, but all theories of federalism describe state and federal lawmaking
power as occupying some separate turf, even if much of it is overlapping. This division of governance describes even modern federalism
doctrine, which does not recognize a judicially-enforceable boundary
between federal and state regulatory prerogatives. Whether as a matter
of politics, pragmatism, or path-dependence, the federal government has
not legislated to the fullest extent of its power, leaving many areas of
policy dominated by state regulation.
65 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
66 Although there is no single federalism

provision, amendment, or clause in the Constitu-

tion, concerns about how the central federal governmtnt and states should share governing
responsibility over the nation animate many parts of the Constitution's text. The constitutional provisions most directly relevant to federalism include the Supremacy Clause, U.S.
Const. art. VI, cl. 2; the Necessary and Proper Clause, id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; the Commerce
Clause, id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; and the Tenth Amendment, id. amend. X.
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Boundary work in constitutional federalism has taken several different forms as federalism itself has evolved. Early conceptions of federalism envisioned separate spheres of state and federal regulatory authority.
The Constitution was seen as protecting states' rights by granting the
federal government only limited, enumerated powers.67 This limitation
on the federal government was underscored by the Tenth Amendment,
which said that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution... are reserved to the States., 68 But when, after the New
Deal, the Court reinterpreted the Commerce Clause to give the federal
government authority to regulate almost any commercial activity,
boundaries dependent on a federal government of limited enumerated
powers seemed doomed.6 9
After three decades of intense federal legislative activity under the
expanded Commerce Clause power, the Court experimented with a new
theory of the federal-state boundary. In NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery, decided in 1976, the Court carved out an area of state sovereignty
that operated free from federal interference and invalidated a federal
statute that crossed that boundary.70 According to the Court, the Tenth
Amendment prohibited federal regulation of "States as States" that "operate[d] to directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions.",71 But when defining "traditional governmental functions" proved unworkable, the
Court once again reinvented the federal-state boundary. In Garciav. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, which overruled National
League of Cities, the Court identified the political process as the primary-and most effective-protector of states' regulatory autonomy.72
That theory's contemporary heir, "process federalism," adds other pro-

67 See
68

Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1485, 1495-96 (1994).
U.S. Const. amend. X.
69 See Kramer, supra note 67, at 1496 (noting that "enumeration ceased to do any real
work long ago").
70 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976).
71 Id. at 842, 852.
72 Thus, the GarciaCourt endorsed the "political safeguards of federalism" over judiciallyenforceable boundaries. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 556
(1985). See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543
(1954) (arguing that because the states are well represented in federal government, they will
block any federal legislation that takes too much sovereign power from the states).
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cedural and political mechanisms-but not judicially-enforceable
rules-to the list of forces that maintain federal-state boundaries.7 3
From the beginning, the Court's antitrust federalism jurisprudence resounded in constitutional federalism and its focus on bounded divisions
of decision-making power. Parker invoked the image of "a dual system
of government" 4 and explained that the Commerce Clause power "did
not wholly withdraw from the states the authority to regulate the commerce with respect to matters of local concern., 75 Later cases, including
Midcal and its progeny, relied on less formalistic tests for the boundary
between state and federal power, but they still conceived of the immunity question as a boundary-drawing exercise. Midcal established a twopart test for that boundary, which was categorized in Hallie as serving
an "evidentiary function" of "ensuring that the actor is engaging in the
challenged conduct pursuant to state policy. '76 Hallie emphasized that
genuine "governmental interests of the State" are within the state boundary and outside of federal reach.7 7 Similarly, Patrickplaced beyond federal reach "conduct [that] promotes state policy."78 These cases at least
appeared to be agnostic as to the substance of that policy, relying on the
constitutional federalist principle that benefits accrue when each sovereign has some freedom to set and execute its own regulatory agenda
within the bounds of its power.
Scholarship analyzing the case law of this era similarly identified antitrust federalism with constitutional federalism and its focus on boundary work. Writing in 1987, Professor Thomas M. Jorde identified the constitutional federalism principles at the heart of antitrust federalism,
arguing that the Court's state action immunity doctrine permitted "states
79
wide latitude to select their own mix of competition and regulation,
and that such legal diversity among the states promoted federalist principles, especially citizen participation. 80 Professor Milton Handler described the boundary affected by antitrust federalism as the inverse of
73See Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 Vill. L. Rev. 1349, 135266 (2001); Kramer, supra note 67, at 1486-87.
74Parker,317 U.S. at 351.
75
1Id.at 360.
76
Hallie, 471 U.S. at 46.
77
Id.at 47.
78 486 U.S. at 101.
79Thomas M. Jorde, Antitrust and the New State Action Doctrine: A Return to Deferential
Economic Federalism, 75 Calif. L. Rev. 227, 230 (1987).
" Id. at 249-50.
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federal preemption, a doctrine typically associated with constitutional
federalism.81 Several scholars criticized Midcal's supervision requirement as too much of a departure from constitutional federalism, arguing
that both kinds of federalism should respect decisions made by a state
within the bounds of its autonomy-no matter what processes the state
used to make them.8 2
Perhaps the strongest case for a close connection between constitutional and antitrust federalism can be found in an article by Professors
James F. Blumstein and Terry Calvani that argues that Parker immunity
has deep ties to the Court's Tenth Amendment jurisprudence, and that
state action immunity protects states when they are performing the "traditional [state] governmental functions" discussed in NationalLeague of
Cities.83 These articles all emphasized what the Court had made plain:
Antitrust federalism and constitutional federalism were close relatives,
and both required a separation between federal and state regulatory activity.
II. THE NEW ANTITRUST FEDERALISM

In its last three antitrust federalism cases, the Court has broken with
the boundary theory of state-federal power sharing it once borrowed
from constitutional federalism. Power sharing in the new antitrust federalism is modeled on administrative law, where federal courts scrutinize
the process of agency decision making in order to ensure agencies' political accountability.
A. The New Antitrust Federalism:From Ticor to NC Dental

The new antitrust federalism can be stated as three principles. First,
under the new antitrust federalism, what constitutes "the state" is a mat81 See Milton Handler, Antitrust-1978, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 1363, 1374-88 (1978).
82 See generally John E. Lopatka, The State of "State Action" Antitrust Immunity: A Pro-

gress Report, 46 La. L. Rev. 941 (1986) (arguing that the state action immunity doctrine
should be clarified as allowing total deference to states' regulatory intent); William H. Page,
Antitrust, Federalism, and the Regulatory Process: A Reconstruction and Critique of the
State Action Exemption After MidcalAluminum, 61 B.U. L. Rev. 1099 (1981) (arguing that
Parkerstands for total deference to considered state decision making, and that Midcal's supervision requirement goes too far in dictating how states may regulate).
83 James F. Blumstein & Terry Calvani, State Action as a Shield and a Sword in a Medical
Services Antitrust Context: Parkerv. Brown in Constitutional Perspective, 1978 Duke L.J.
389, 419-24, 422 n.193 (quoting Nat'l League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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ter of federal, not state law. Second, according to that federal law-an
interpretation of the Sherman Act-federal antitrust enforcement must
forbear only when the state has followed certain procedures in creating
anticompetitive regulation. Third, those procedures are designed to force
states to take political accountability-that is, to take transparent credit
or blame-for the challenged anticompetitive activity.
1. Ticor Title: Assigning PoliticalResponsibility
It is tempting to think of the new antitrust federalism as comprising
only the Court's last two antitrust federalism cases-2013's FTC v.
Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc. 8 4 and 2015's NC Dental85-because
two decades of Supreme Court inactivity separate Phoebe Putney from
the previous case decided by the Court, 1992's FTC v. Ticor Title Insurance Co.8 6 But in fact, Ticor sounds more in the new antitrust federalism
than the old, even if it does not contain NC Dental's full-throated rejection of the boundary model. Whether Ticor is seen as presaging the new
antitrust federalism, or straddling the new and the old, it is properly discussed in conjunction with the two more recent cases, although separated from them by time.
In Ticor, the Court introduced the notion of political accountability as
a condition of state action immunity, a theme that would mature in its
more recent cases. The plaintiffs in Ticor challenged several states' ratesetting programs for title searches, arguing that the state did not supervise the rate setting and so did not meet Midcal's second prong. The
Court agreed, rejecting the states' argument that they supervised the
programs because they had-but did not exercise-the power to review
the rate schedules. 87 Explaining that potential supervision was insufficient under Midcal, the Court introduced a new way to understand
Midcal's two-step: not only as a signal that the regulation was "the
State's own," 88 but as evidence that the state had taken political accountability for it in the eyes of its voters. The opinion explained, "States
must accept political responsibility for actions they intend to under-

" 133 S. Ct. 1003 (2013).
81 135 S. Ct. 1101.
86 504 U.S. 621 (1992).
87 Id. at 638.
88 Id. at 635.
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take.... Federalism serves to assign political responsibility, not to obscure it."' 9
2. Phoebe Putney.: Raising the Barfor ClearArticulation
Phoebe Putney built on this emphasis on credit-and-blame accountability by setting a new, higher bar for "clear articulation" under the first
prong of the Midcal test.90 The case involved the purchase of a private
hospital by a Georgia hospital authority that would "substantially lessen
competition or tend to create, if not create, a monopoly." 9' The hospital
authority argued that it was entitled to state action immunity because it
met Midcal's first requirement that it acted pursuant to a "clearly articulated.., state policy to displace competition., 92 It based this claim on a
state statute that authorized cities and counties to create hospital authorities, which had the power to acquire hospitals. 93 The authority argued
that the market for healthcare was so concentrated in Georgia that most
hospital purchases would run afoul of the Sherman Act's standards, and
thus the state reasonably anticipated anticompetitive conduct when it
gave hospital authorities the ability to acquire hospitals.94
The Court rejected the authority's arguments, requiring more to show
clear articulation than it had in previous cases. It rejected the lower
court's holding that anticompetitive effects need only be "reasonably anticipated" by a state statute, 95 a holding that seemed consistent with the
Court's previous rule that state authorizing language needed merely to
"contemplate[]" anticompetitive regulation. 96 The Phoebe Putney Court
articulated a higher standard, explaining that the authorized conduct
97
needed to be "inherently anticompetitive" to entail clear articulation.
89 Id.

at 636.

90 133 S. Ct. at 1101.
91 FTC

v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 663 F.3d 1369, 1375 (1lth Cir. 2011). The

merged hospital would "account for 86 percent of the market for acute-care hospital services ... in the six counties surrounding Albany[, Georgia]." Phoebe Putney, 133 S. Ct. at
1008.
92 See Phoebe Putney, 133 S. Ct. at 1009. In dicta, the Court explained that "local governmental entities," such as the hospital authority, are not subject to the supervision requirement. Id. at 1011.
93 Id. at 1007-08.
94 Id. at 1014.
95
Id. at 1009 (internal quotation marks omitted).
96 See Cmty. Commc'ns Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 55 (1982) (internal quotation
marks
97 omitted); La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. at 394.
Phoebe Putney, 133 S. Ct. at 1012-13.

2016]

New Antitrust Federalism

1407

Although the opinion did not mention political accountability as such,
the holding was consistent with Ticor's emphasis on states taking credit
and blame for anticompetitive regulation. A stricter test for clear articulation leads to sharper lines of accountability: The stronger the statement
from the state, the easier it is for voters to blame or credit the state for its
regulations and policies. The higher the bar for immunity, the more heat
the state must take for unpopular anticompetitive regulation that it has
placed outside the reach of federal antitrust enforcement. And reading
between the lines of the opinion, the Phoebe Putney Court did seem
concerned about the possibility that the state, the hospital authority, and
the merging private hospital had used a complex shell game to diffuse
blame for the effective merger-to-monopoly that they created. 98
3. NC Dental: The New Antitrust FederalismHas Arrived
The latent themes of accountability in Ticor and Phoebe Putney became explicit in the Court's 2015 decision in NC Dental.99 The case alleged that North Carolina's Board of Dental Examiners violated the
Sherman Act by sending cease-and-desist letters to nondentist providers
of teeth whitening. 0° The letters averred that teeth whitening was "the
practice of dentistry," and therefore, teeth whitening by nondentists
(which had become popular in mall kiosks and beauty salons) constituted the unlicensed practice of dentistry in violation of North Carolina
law.10 1 The Federal Trade Commission sued the Board, and the Board
defended by arguing that it was entitled to state action immunity because

98The opinion details the complex web of subsidiaries-some connected by one-dollarlease agreements-that the authority created, implying that it had attempted to disguise the
true parties to the transaction. Id. at 1008. The transaction was complex: As authorized by
the state statute, the city of Albany and Dougherty County created a hospital authority,
which purchased Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital. The Authority then created Phoebe
Putney Health System, Inc. ("PPHS"), and a subsidiary known as Phoebe Putney Memorial
Hospital, Inc. ("PPMH"). The Authority leased the hospital to PPMH for one dollar a year.
PPHS then entered an agreement, with approval from the Authority, to purchase the competing hospital, Palmyra Medical Center, with PPHS funds. The deal contemplated that PPHS
would create yet another subsidiary to manage the hospital, to which PPHS would lease
Palmyra for "$1 per year under the Memorial lease agreement." Id.
99
NC Dental, 135 S. Ct. 1101.
100
Id. at 1108-09.
"' NC Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1108 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Appendix To
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 103a, NCDental, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (No. 13-534)).
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it acted according to a clearly articulated state policy1 2and as a "state
agency," it did not need supervision to enjoy immunity. 1
Because Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire suggested that the
shortcut-skipping supervision-was available not only to cities but to
other sub-state entities not involving "a private party," 103 the battleground of NC Dental was what under the old antitrust federalism was a
formal question: Was the Board private or public? The Board argued in
this formalist vein, claiming that as a "state agency," it was part of the
state and so entitled to take the shortcut. 10 4 The Board cited several facts
as supporting its status as a state agency, including the requirement that
its members "swear an oath of allegiance to the State," the Board's duty
to "comply with the State's administrative procedure act," and the power
of the Board to promulgate rules and regulations with the force of law.1 05
But the Board's strongest argument was that the State of North Carolina
itself considered the Board to be a "state agency,"' 1 6 and joined as ami-

cus curiae on its behalf. 107

If the question of what is "the state" or "a state agency" for immunity
purposes were a question of state law, then North Carolina's litigation
position on behalf of the Board should have been the end of the story.0l'
And under the old antitrust federalism, that may have been the case. But
the new emphasis on full state accountability for immune regulation in
Ticor and Phoebe Putney pointed towards a new rule: Acts of the state,
for immunity purposes, are defimed as a matter of federal antitrust law to
include only those acts for which the state takes full and transparent political accountability. Allowing entities like the Board of Dental Exam02
1 N.C.

State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs v. FTC, 717 F.3d 359, 368 (4th Cir. 2013); see also
NC Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1108-09 ("The Board moved to dismiss, alleging state-action immunity.").
103471 U.S. 34, 46 n.10 (1985).
104 Here the Board had help from the Court's dicta in Hallie that suggested "[i]n cases in
which the actor is a state agency, it is likely that active state supervision would also not be
reuired, although we do not here decide that issue." Id.
5 Brief for Petitioner at 6, NC Dental, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (No. 13-534), 2014 WL 2212529,
at *6.
106 As the dissent in NC Dental observed, the state statute creating the board called it an
"agency of the state." See NCDental, 135 S. Ct. at 1120 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 90-22(b) (2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
107 See Brief of Amici Curiae State of West Virginia and 22 Other States in Support of Petitioner at 1, NC Dental, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (No. 13-534), 2014 WL 2506625, at *1 [hereinafter
West Virginia Briefi.
108 This was the NC Dental dissent's position, and has the benefits of simplicity and clarity. See NC Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1117-18 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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iners-which operate outside of the political limelight-to take the Hallie shortcut would allow North Carolina to avoid taking the political heat
for higher priced, less convenient teeth whitening for its citizens.
The NC Dental Court therefore adopted an accountability-based test
for whether the Board was sufficiently governmental to take the
shortcut. It held that, "[A] state board on which a controlling number of
decisionmakers are active market participants in the occupation the
board regulates must satisfy Midcal's active supervision requirement in
order to invoke state-action antitrust immunity." 10 9 The high risk of selfinterest, coupled with an almost total lack of accountability to the voters,
made the Board "private" and so immune only after passing the strictest
version of the Midcal test. 110 The Court explained, "Immunity for state
agencies... requires more than a mere facade of state involvement, for
it is necessary in light of Parker'srationale to ensure the States accept
political accountability for anticompetitive conduct they permit and con111
trol."
Thus NC Dental completed the Court's revolution away from the old
paradigm where the state's intent marked a bright line defining its immunity. The difference between NC Dental and the old regime is evident
from the dissent in the case, which would have found immunity based
on the principle laid out in old antitrust federalism cases like Bates v.
State Bar of Arizona'12 and Hoover v. Ronwin' 13 : State regulation, however the state designs it, is exempt from the Sherman Act. The dissent
invoked the old formalism when it said that "[u]nder Parker,the Sherman Act... [does] not apply to state agencies; the North Carolina Board
of Dental Examiners is a state agency; and that is the end of the matter." ' 1 4 According to the dissent, the fact that the state statute creating
the Board referred to it as an "agency of the State" was dispositive of the
immunity question.115 That the majority took a different view shows that
the Court had once and for all rejected the false formalism of boundary
drawing.

109 Id. at 1114 (majority opinion).
110Id.

Id.at 1111.

112433 U.S. 350, 359 (1977).
113 466 U.S. 558, 568-69 (1984).

114
NC Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1117-18 (Alito, J., dissenting).

115
Id. at 1120-21 (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 90-22(b) (2013)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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B. The New Model: FederalAdministrative Law

The Court's new antitrust federalism finds its theoretical roots in administrative law, where procedural review dominates. Whereas constitutional federalism requires power sharing in parallel--even if the boundary between federal and state regulatory authorities is not judicially
enforceable after Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authori-

ty 116-administrative law envisions hierarchical power sharing between
agencies and courts sitting in review of their decisions. In administrative
law, therefore, questions about turf and boundaries between the decision-making bodies are less important than questions about the depth of
judicial review and the criteria courts can use in overturning agency decisions.' 17 For the most part, administrative law asks courts to focus on
the processes used by an agency in making a decision, with an eye toward holding agencies accountable for their choices.118 So too in the new
antitrust federalism, where the Court now focuses on reviewing state decision-making procedures in order to enhance states' political accountability for anticompetitive regulation.
1. Process Review in Administrative Law

In part, the judicial focus on process in the administrative context is
doctrinally inevitable; most cases challenging agency action are brought
under the Administrative Procedure Act119 ("APA") or a similarly procedurally-focused statute. Under the APA, courts consider allegations
that an agency failed to adhere to a statute's often demanding directions
for how to make decisions. Rules made according to notice-andcomment rulemaking (informal rulemaking under Section 553 of the
APA 12°) can be challenged on a variety of procedural grounds, including

116 469 U.S. 529 (1985).
17Cf. Jim Rossi, Antitrust Process and Vertical Deference: Judicial Review of State

Regulatory Inaction, 93 Iowa L. Rev. 185, 188 (2007) (referring to judicial deference to
agency regulation as "traditional[] issues of administrative law").
118 See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2269 (2001)
(explaining that courts today avoid substantive review and "incline instead toward enforcing
structures and methods of decision making designed to enable or assist other actors [including Congress, the president, and interest groups] to influence administrative actions and policies").
119
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq. (2012).
120 Id. § 553.

2016]

New Antitrust Federalism

1411

as being inadequately responsive to comments,121 based in faulty or non122
existent reasoning (such as failing to consider an obvious alternative),
or tainted by ex parte communications. 123 Agency adjudications can be
challenged for failure to adhere to the APA's requirements that include
notice, hearing, development of a record, and an explanation of reasoning. 124 Further, procedures used in individualized decision making can
be challenged as violating the Due Process Clause of the Constitution,
which under some circumstances can require process beyond that specifled in the APA or the statute establishing the agency's authority. 125
The judicial focus on procedure in reviewing agency decision making,
however, can be justified as more than a doctrinal feature made inevitable by the APA. Agencies have been seen-to varying degrees through126
out the history of the administrative state-as more technically expert
and more democratically legitimate 127 than the federal courts. Yet there
has also been anxiety within the judiciary, Congress, and academia
about agency capture and the possibility of systematic regulatory drift
from Congress's interests towards those of industry and other powerful

121See

I Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise § 7.4, at 443 (4th ed. 2002)

(observing that a statement of basis and purpose that does not adequately respond to comments made during the notice-and-comment period is likely to result in a court concluding
that the rule is "arbitrary and capricious").
122 See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29,
46-49 (1983) (setting aside a vehicle safety rule as arbitrary and capricious because the
agency failed to consider requiring airbags only).
123See, e.g., Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 55 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
124 See Pierce, supra note 121, § 8.2, at 531 (describing the APA's requirements for formal
adjudication).
125 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266 (1970) (imposing trial-like procedural
requirements-such as a live evidentiary hearing where the claimant can be present, submit
evidence, and confront adverse witnesses-on administrative termination of government
benefits).
126
See Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 Chi.-Kent L.
Rev. 1039, 1049 (1997) (noting that during the early years of the APA, agencies were seen
as having "the specialized information and systematic knowledge-in other words, the expertise-to comprehend complex problems and to fashion rational solutions to them").
127
See Bradley George Hubbard, Comment, Deference to Agency Statutory Interpretations First Advanced in Litigation? The Chevron Two-Step and the Skidmore Shuffle, 80 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 447, 456-57 (2013) (noting that "concerns about the 'judicial activism [of] the
1960s and 1970s,' prompted the Court to conclude that agency interpretations are more
democratically legitimate and provide greater safeguards against errant interpretations than
those of the judiciary" (alteration in original) (footnote omitted)).
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lobbying groups. 128 Procedural review emerged as a way for courts to
harness the benefits of agency decision making while minimizing the
risks associated with capture. Procedural review has operated as a kind
of middle ground, where courts (at least appear to) avoid substantive
retaining some tools to hold
second-guessing of agency choices, while
129
decisions.
their
for
accountable
agencies
Consequently, the intensity of procedural review has expanded and
contracted as faith in agency decision making ebbed and flowed
throughout the last century. Professor Thomas Merrill argues that during
what he calls the "capture theory era"-running from 1967 to 1983faith in the technocratic expertise of agencies had given way to deep
anxieties about industry capture and biased agency decision making.130
This era saw the rise of the most intense standards of procedural review.
For example, in 1971, the Supreme Court created "hard look review" in
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,1 31 which allowed
13 2
courts to vacate agency decisions that lacked a full explanatory basis.
During this era, courts also experimented with imposing additional procedural requirements on a case-by-case basis beyond those required by
the APA, 133 and expanded the due process requirement for agency decision making.
But although courts have demonstrated an appetite for secondguessing the process of agency decision making-especially during the
"capture theory era"---courts have also largely deferred to the substance
of agency decisions. The Overton Park Court went so far as to approve
134
of judicial inquiry into the "mental processes" of the decisionmakers,
but did not-at least formally--condone courts reversing agency decisions as substantively undesirable or incongruent with congressional in128 See Merrill, supra note 126, at 1059-67 (summarizing the judicial and academic attitudes towards agency capture during what Professor Merrill calls the "capture theory era" of
administrative law).
129 See Ganesh Sitaraman, Foreign Hard Look Review, 66 Admin. L. Rev. 489, 497 (2014)
(calling intensive procedural review of agency decision making "an intermediate standard
between judicial abdication and judicial entanglement").
130 See Merrill, supra note 126, at 1060 (observing that "the idea that effective government
means management by a politically neutral technocratic elite fell into deep disfavor" in part
because of the belief that the regulators were captured).

"3'401 U.S. 402 (1971).

132 See Sitaraman, supra note 129, at 500.
133This practice was ultimately shut down

by the Supreme Court in Vermont Yankee Nu-

clearPower Corp. v. NaturalResources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519, 523-25 (1978).
134 Overton Park,401 U.S. at 420.
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tent. 35 The result has been that agencies enjoy some substantive regulatory autonomy, even if their hands are tied as to procedure.
2. Process Review in the New Antitrust Federalism
The Court's new antitrust federalism likewise defers to substance
while enforcing procedural requirements on states. In the new antitrust
federalism, the "clear articulation" requirement-reinvigorated in Phoebe Putney-asks a procedural question when it requires assurance that
the state has actually delegated regulatory authority to the decisionmaker. At the same time, the "clear articulation" requirement asks courts to
remain agnostic about whether the state's regulatory agenda is substantively pro- or anti-competitive, 116 or wise or efficient."'
The "active supervision" requirement under the new regime, tightened up by the holding in Ticor and more recently by dicta in NC Dental, is likewise procedural. It requires states to use one of four methods
of regulation.'38 First, states may regulate directly though their sovereign
branches and enjoy immunity as a matter of course. Second, a state may
use a governmental board or council made up of disinterested bureaucrats, and the state need not supervise it to confer immunity. Third, it
may delegate regulation to industry itself, provided that the state also actively supervises that regulation. The fourth and probably least attractive 1 9 procedural option is to use industry self-regulation, not supervise
it, and face the threat of antitrust liability for anticompetitive rules.
In both contexts-in administrative law and in the new antitrust federalism-the aim of procedural review may be to curb substantively undesirable regulation, whether that is defined as regulation out of line
with congressional intent or regulation that is excessively anticompeti-

135 See Kagan, supra note

118, at 2269 (observing that courts "usually shy away

from... substantive review of agency outcomes").
136 In fact, as the Court has interpreted it, the Mideal test assumes that the regulatory intent
is anticompetitive by requiring a clearly articulated "state policy to displace competition with
regulation." Hallie, 471 U.S. at 44.
37 Cf. NC Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1111 (explaining that in deciding whether activity is im-

mune from the antitrust laws, "[t]he question is not whether the challenged conduct is efficient, well-functioning, or wise").
138 Cf. Edlin & Haw, supra note 22, at 1154-56 (explaining that antitrust liability for selfregulatory boards presents states with three regulatory options, and implying a fourth: accepting antitrust liability for boards).
39
'
See West Virginia Brief, supra note 107, at 11 (explaining that liability for practitionerdominated boards will force states into other regulatory schemes).
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tive. But in both contexts the path to better regulation is indirect: It uses
review of procedure, with an eye towards accountability, to get there.
III. THE NEW REGIME: A BETTER FIT FOR THE REALITIES OF STATE
REGULATION

The new antitrust federalism is an improvement on the old. The old
model was designed for a world where states primarily regulated using
entities that were recognizably governmental, such as their own sovereign branches or commissions made up of disinterested bureaucrats. In
this world, linedrawing between state and private activity was possible.
As it became clear that much state regulation was done by delegation to
entities that had only a nominal connection to the sovereign branches of
the state, such as professional licensing boards made up of license holders actively working in the profession, 140 the boundary model faltered.
The new antitrust federalism is a response to the modem realities of state
regulation where industry self-regulation--or what I call "inherent capture"--is ubiquitous. It is reasonably tailored to strike a compromise between state autonomy and federal competition policy because it imposes
additional procedures on states when they use the most competitively
risky means of regulation: regulation by industry itself.
A. The Old Model Falters
From its inception in Parker, state action immunity demanded a stable definition of the state. When decisions were made by sovereign
branches of a state's government, such as the legislature or the Supreme
Court, it was easy for courts to declare such regulation "state action" and
so entitled to immunity. 141 But Parker'sseemingly off-hand observation
that states may not merely authorize private violations of the Sherman

140 See Edlin & Haw, supra note 22, at 1119-20 (explaining that "states rarely regulate
economic activity directly through a legislative act.... [More often] states delegate rulemaking and rate-setting to agencies, councils, or boards dominated by private citizens").
141See, e.g., Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 567-68 (1984) (explaining that "when a
state legislature adopts legislation, its actions constitute those of the State and ipsofacto are
exempt from the operation of the antitrust laws" (citation omitted)); Bates v. State Bar of
Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 360 (1977) (finding "the affirmative command of the Arizona Supreme
Court" immune).
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Act 142 became critical in the 1980s when the Court confronted the realities of state regulation. A substantial portion of regulatory activity had
been delegated to commissions, councils, and boards dominated by industry members. 143 The question in these cases was whether, in Parker's
terms, such an entity's activity was "private" or "public"; a question that
Parkerfailed to answer.
The model behind antitrust federalism--constitutional federalismprovided little guidance. Constitutional federalism was itself standing on
shaky ground during antitrust federalism's crisis moment. In the decade
after Midcal, when the Court decided an antitrust federalism case every
year in an effort to accommodate the old boundary model to the new
state regulation realities, the Court decided Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.1" The Court's announcement in that case
that it would no longer police the constitutional federalist boundary between the federal government and the states
prompted scholars to de1 45
clare the death of (constitutional) federalism.
But there was more than its "death" that made constitutional federalism a problematic model for its antitrust counterpart. Although both federalisms are ultimately concerned with how the states and federal government share power, they ask fundamentally different questions. In the
constitutional context, the question is: How far may federal regulatory
power go in intruding on states' regulatory autonomy? Constitutional
federalism, therefore, draws the state-federal line with reference to limits
6
on federal power, reserving the remaining authority to the states. 14 Anti142 See Parker, 317 U.S. at 351 (explaining that "a state does not give immunity to those
who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their action is lawful").
143 These sub-state entities were at issue in FTC v. Ticor Title Insurance Co., 504 U.S. 621
(1992) (rate bureaus); Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94 (1988) (medical peer-review committee); Southern Motor CarriersRate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48 (1985)
(rate bureaus); Hoover, 466 U.S. 558 (bar association); New Motor Vehicle Board of California v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978) (automobile board); Bates, 433 U.S. 350 (bar
association); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976) (electric utility); and Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (bar association).
'44 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
145 See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 67, at 1494 (paraphrasing the argument that "federalism is
'dead"'); Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 Iowa L. Rev.
243, 246 (2005) ("Dual federalism is dead.").
146 See U.S. Const. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people."). Of course this line between state and federal regulatory activity is not crisp, as the
Court's anti-commandeering cases--cases striking down federal statutes that conscripted
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trust federalism draws the line between federal and state power with reference to the public-private divide, with public (state) activity receiving
147
immunity and private cartelization receiving federal antitrust scrutiny.
The key question in antitrust federalism is: Is this conduct public or private?
The public-private distinction is notoriously fraught. 148 Importing the
Court's jurisprudence from constitutional "state action" cases-an area
of law with a similar name but quite a different approach-is unhelpful.
The Constitution's requirement that "state actors" are bound by its proscriptions means that courts must distinguish private from governmental
conduct, a particularly vexing question in an era of privatization of services traditionally provided by government. 149 The criteria developed by
the Court to distinguish public from private conduct in constitutional
state action cases afford little guidance to antitrust federalism's publicprivate question. Constitutional state action doctrine is concerned with
protecting individuals' rights by not allowing states to offload their constitutional responsibilities. This concern cuts against a narrow definition
of "the state" in favor of a functional standard that prevents states from
strategically outsourcing constitutionally sensitive governmental
tasks. 150 In antitrust federalism, the interests and incentives of states are
the opposite. States want as free a hand to regulate as possible, and that
typically includes the right to delegate regulation to private regulators
with the assurance that the regulation will be immune to antitrust chal-

state lawmaking and enforcement mechanisms to achieve federal ends-made clear. See
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992). The rise of cooperative federalism likewise illustrates that the boundary between
federal and state regulatory activity is hardly a bright line.
147 See Garland, supra note 34, at 501 (describing the state action doctrine as an attempt
to
distinguish private from public activity).
148 See, e.g., Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L.
Rev.
543, 548-49 (2000); Alexander Volokh, The New Private-Regulation Skepticism: Due Process, Non-Delegation, and Antitrust Challenges, 37 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 931, 940 (2014)
(calling the public-private distinction "fuzzy" and providing examples).
149 See Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1367, 1369-70
(2003) (describing the difficulties the rise of privatization has created for constitutional state
action doctrine).
150 See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 473 (1953) (broadly defining state action to
include any "[s]tate responsibility-that somewhere, somehow, to some extent, there be an
infusion of conduct by officials, panoplied with State power, into any scheme by which colored citizens are denied voting rights merely because they are colored").
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lenge.151 Here, broad definitions of "the state" enable the gamesmanship
Midcal warned against: the possibility that states would sanction private
15 2
antitrust violations through only nominal governmental involvement.
With self-regulation making it difficult to formally distinguish private
from state activity, and without a useful theory of power sharing to resolve the hard cases, it is unsurprising that the old antitrust federalism
faltered. The Court's period of fumbles and false starts-from 1975's
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar153 to 1992's FTC v. Ticor Title Insurance
Co.154-eventually led it to a new theory, one that was grounded in administrative law's focus on accountability review.
B. The New Model Responds: FightingCapture, PreservingDeference
Accountability review of state decision making is a better model for
power sharing between federal antitrust enforcement and state regulation. First, it can help curb anticompetitive rent seeking made inevitable
by industry self-regulation. Self-regulation is a kind of capture-it is inherent capture. It seems reasonable, therefore, to import accountability
review from administrative law, where concerns about capture are paramount. 155 Second, in both antitrust federalism and administrative law
some deference is due, and accountability review leaves the primary decisionmaker some autonomy. It is an intermediate standard that may be
able to hinder excessively anticompetitive state regulation while preserving the federalism envisioned in Parker.
1. Fighting Capture
When it comes to the new antitrust federalism, the story shares many
features of the "capture theory era" of administrative law from 19671983.156 Both follow a period of relative sanguinity about regulation
151Cf. West Virginia Brief, supra note 107, at 7 (calling the supervision requirement as a

condition of immunity for self-regulatory boards, a "direct attack on the States' ability to use
a method of governance that they have found desirable and beneficial").
152 See Midcal, 445 U.S. at 106 (warning that "[t]he national policy in favor of competition
cannot be thwarted by casting such a gauzy cloak of state involvement over what is essentiall a private price-fixing arrangement").
15
421 U.S. 773 (1975).
154 504 U.S. 621 (1992).

155 See Kagan, supra note 118, at 2264-65 (observing that "[t]he view that firms subject to
regulation had 'captured' the agencies gained wide currency beginning in the 1960s" and
influenced the development of administrative law).
156 See Merrill, supra note 126, at 1059-67.
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where the two decisionmakers-federal courts and agencies in the administrative law context, and federal courts and states in the antitrust
context-were content to divide power without intrusive judicial second-guessing. And in both instances, the federal courts' mistrust of captured regulation led them to increase the intensity of judicial review of
the regulatory process.
(a) Capture in the Administrative State. The capture theory of administrative decision making is by now familiar. A federal agency's decisions tend to offer diffuse benefits to large numbers of people: A cleaner
environment, safer cars, and more effective drugs make almost everyone
better off. But the costs of regulation are typically concentrated on a
smaller number of actors, such as oil companies, automobile manufacturers, and pharmaceutical companies. This asymmetry means that the
beneficiaries of regulation who may want to lobby for harsher standards
face a larger collective action problem than their adversaries.15 7 As the
more effective lobbyists, industry will tend to exert an outsized influence, and regulations
will be more lenient and industry-friendly than
15 8
Congress intended.
Adding to this effect is the "revolving door" problem. 5 9 One of the
benefits of agency over judicial or legislative decision making is that
agencies tend to involve experts more directly in making decisions. But
expertise has a cost: Knowledge of an industry typically comes from
working within it, and so experts that agencies consult, employ, or even
use as leaders are often former industry members, 160 leading to proindustry bias. And because government work is in turn valuable in the
labor market, many of these experts return to industry after their service
in an agency. This bias, whether simply a disposition or a product of implicit quid pro quo arrangements between the regulators and their once

157This

is a version of the "'exploitation' of the great by the small" that can occur because
of collective action problems. See Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action: Public
Goods and the Theory of Groups 29 (1965) (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted).
158 For an account of how capture theory developed and became highly influential in
the
administrative context, see John Shepard Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 713, 724-26 (1986), and sources cited therein.
159 For an overview of the "revolving door" problem in agency regulation, see Rachel E.
Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 Tex. L.
Rev. 15, 45-49 (2010).
160See id. at 23 (noting that "the heads of agencies often anticipate entering or
returning to
employment with the regulated industry once their government service terminates").
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and future employers, adds to the risk of antiregulatory drift from Congress's intent.
Congress thus faces a principal-agent problem in delegating to agencies, one that it has attempted to solve by writing increasingly specific
instructions when giving agencies regulatory authority. Modem statutes
are a far cry from the three-paragraph Sherman Antitrust Act; the Affordable Care Act, for example, takes up almost a thousand pages of the
Federal Code. 161 This level of statutory specificity can serve as a check
on capture since only "reasonable" interpretations of the statute will survive judicial scrutiny. The specificity often extends to procedural requirements designed to limit the power of special interests adverse to
Congress's intent. 162 Process requirements-such as notice-andcomment inrulemakings and due process in adjudications-theoretically
raise the costs of naked rent dealing by giving nonindustry interests a
seat at the table and building a record that exposes an agency's conduct
to political sunshine and judicial review. 163 Of course, process review
has not been seen as an unqualified success in combatting capture.1 64 But
it is often justified, at least theoretically, as increasing accountability and
therefore alleviating capture, and itseems at least plausible that capture is less of a problem with procedural review than without it.
(b) "Inherent Capture" in Antitrust Federalism. Capture has been a
theme in antitrust federalism since its inception in Parker. One way of
understanding the Court's admonition that "a state does not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate
it, or by declaring that their action is lawful, 166 is as a prohibition on an
extreme form of capture, in which an anticompetitive actor, such as a

161NFIB

dissenting) ("The ACA is
v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2675 (2012) (Scalia, J.,

over 900 pages long.").
162 See Pierce, supra note 121, § 7.7, at 485-92 (discussing examples of additional requirements some statutes impose on rulemaking).
163 See Kagan, supra note 118, at 2265-67 (observing that a response to capture fears was
to increase participation in agency decision making); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in
American Public Law, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 29, 63 (1985) (explaining that hard-look review
serves to prevent the subversion of "governing values ...through the domination of powerful private groups").
See Kagan, supra note 118, at 2267-68.
165 See Merrill, supra note 126, at 1093 (describing the rise of procedural review as a response to capture problems).
166Parker,317 U.S. at 351.
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cartel, is able to extract official sanction from the state.167 Goldfarb's
holding-that the Virginia State Bar was operating outside of its authority, and thus outside of the state's bounds when it encouraged compliance
with fee schedules168--can also be cast in terms of capture. As a professional organization comprised of all licensed lawyers in the state, the
Bar was a per se captured agency and thus was not entitled to immunity. 16 Likewise, the holding in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co. was perhaps
motivated by suspicion that the utility's "participation"
in the state
170
commission's regulation led to favorable treatment.
Antitrust scholars have noted the role that capture theory played during the development of state action immunity in the 1970s and 1980s.
Perhaps the most prominent example is then-Professor John Shepard
Wiley's article in the HarvardLaw Review providing "A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism," in which he argued that the Court has allowed the Sherman Act to trample state autonomy because of a lack of
faith in the public interest theory of state regulation. 7 ' He argued against
the Midcal test in favor of either full deference to states, which he equated with the holding in Parker,172 or a substantive review of state regulation that would look at a restriction's anticompetitive impact and the
likelihood that it arose because of capture. 173 Although he did not endorse Wiley's capture test, Professor Einer Elhauge did invoke a kind of
capture-the inherent capture of Goldfarb-when he advocated for antitrust liability for any set of actors, even nominally governmental ones,
1 74
that were dominated by financial self-interest.
167 Yet by drawing a deferential boundary between a state and the Sherman Act, Parker

exhibited a relatively optimistic perspective on state regulation. See Wiley, supra note 158,
at 715 (describing the ParkerCourt as embracing "the dominant view of the time that regulation was both economically necessary to combat market failures and politically legitimated
by the mandate of broad political majorities").
168Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 790-92.
169The Goldfarb Court emphasized the self-interest inherent in regulation of lawyers by a
bar association when it described the bar's stance on fee schedules as "foster[ing] anticompetitive practices for the benefit of its members." Id. at 791.
170 428 U.S. 579, 594 (1976).

"7 Wiley, supra note 158, at 714.
172Id. at 739-40 (suggesting that a return to "Parker'spremise of deference to state sovereignty" is preferable to the Court's awkward compromise in Midcal, but also noting that
such a move would be "doctrinally traumatic").
113Id. at 741-76 (proposing a test for whether state regulation is a product of capture and
thus, in Professor Wiley's view, not entitled to immunity).
174Einer Richard Elhauge, The Scope of Antitrust Process, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 667, 696704(1991).
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Today, it is clear that "capture" understates the problem in state regulation. A significant portion of state regulation is left to inherently captured boards, commissions, and councils comprised of industry members
themselves.175 Inherent capture has all the problems of ordinary capture,
but to an even greater degree. Industry self-regulation puts regulators in
the pocket of industry because the regulators are industry. Where the
federal administrative state has a revolving door problem, state regulation has something even worse, because board members are not asked to
don even a pretense of civil service. Many statutes creating boards and
commissions endowed with the power to create state regulations actually
require current industry membership for service.
A prominent example is professional licensing, the context for the NC
Dental case. 176 Most state statutes establishing professional licensing
bodies delegate rulemaking and enforcement to a board that must be
comprised of a majority of currently-licensed professionals, 7 7 putting
the reins of competition into the hands of those who stand to gain the
most from anticompetitive restrictions. This authority to make professional entry and practice rules-powerful tools to deal rents to incumbent practitioners and to raise prices to consumers-has been abused.
Empirical work shows that heavy-handed professional licensing tends to
raise prices for professional services without measurable gain in service
other areas of state
quality. 78 Similar industry self-regulation appears in 79
1
regulation.
liquor
and
rate-setting
utility
as
law, such
The reasons why states acquiesce to this self-dealing, even though it
injures its citizens, are supplied by more capture theory. Professionals,
utilities, and other industry groups, in contrast to consumers, are wellorganized and motivated, and so have political power to encourage a

175See Edlin & Haw, supra note 22, at 1141 (arguing that because most professional licensing boards must be comprised of a majority of professionals, they "are literally and excaptured .... [They] are born captured").
plicitly
176 It is no coincidence that a substantial portion of the Court's antitrust federalism cases
have involved professional regulation. See NC Dental, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (dentists); Patrick v.
Burget, 486 U.S. 94 (1988) (doctors); Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984) (lawyers);
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (lawyers); Goldfarb, 421 U.S. 773 (law17See Edlin & Haw, supra note 22, at 1103 & app.
178See id. at 1114 and sources cited therein.
179 See, e.g., Ticor, 504 U.S. 621 (rate setting); 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335
(1987) (liquor); S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48 (1985)
(rate setting); Midcal, 445 U.S. 97 (liquor).
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hands-off attitude from the state. 180 States face relatively little electoral
discipline for their delegations because these boards are too numerous
and small, and the activities of any single board are too obscure to raise
public outrage. States engage in a cost-benefit analysis, where the political cost of displeased consumers is smaller than the benefit of the enthusiastic support of organized professions and other industries. Finally,
self-regulation with antitrust immunity is cheap. To the extent these industries demand rents, and states face incentives to supply them, suspending antitrust liability can be an efficient way to deal those rents. It
allows the industry to write its own check with minimal effort or involvement of the state bureaucracy. And self-regulation can even be remunerative for the state; in the case of professional licensing and alcohol
regulation, anticompetitive regulation can line
the state coffers with rev181
enue from taxes, licensing fees, and tariffs.
There is ample evidence that in designing the new antitrust federalism
the Court was reacting to capture, especially inherent capture. In FTC v.
Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc., the issue is apparent from the facts
section, which highlights the disturbingly cozy relationship between the
state and private actors involved in the hospital merger. 8 2 In the NC
Dental opinion, capture fears take center stage. The Court was aware of
the incentives that states have to acquiesce to self-dealing selfregulation, having received multiple amicus briefs on the excesses of
professional licensing boards. 83 So while the Court seemed to note with
approval the long tradition of self-regulation in medicine and dentis-

180 See Morris M. Kleiner, Licensing Occupations: Ensuring Quality or Restricting Competition? 44-46 (2006) (discussing the political economy of professional licensing).
181 See Morris M. Kleiner, Guild-Ridden Labor Markets: The Curious Case of Occupa-

tional Licensing 14-15 (2015) (observing that "fees from licensed members of the occupation are greater than the cost of monitoring the licensing provisions of the occupation, [so]
the government entity doing the licensing is more likely to gain revenue as a consequence of
this form of regulation" and saying that this revenue "provides an incentive
for... government to pass and sign licensing legislation," such as legislation creating selfregulatory licensing boards).
182133 S. Ct. 1003, 1008 (2013) (describing the self-interested machinations of the parties
to the Phoebe Putney deal).
183See Brief of Antitrust Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 2, NC
Dental, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (No. 13-534), 2014 WL 3908427, at *2; Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation and Cato Institute in Support of Respondent at 4-6, NC Dental, 135
S. Ct. 1101 (No. 13-534), 2014 WL 3895927, at *4-6.
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try, 184 it also highlighted the need for states to supervise self-regulation,
"particularly in light of the risks licensing boards dominated by market
'
participants may pose to the free market."185
Further, the test devised in NC Dental is based on capture. 18 6 When
the Court held that "a state board on which a controlling number of decisionmakers are active market participants in the occupation the board
regulates must satisfy Midcal's active supervision requirement in order
to invoke state-action antitrust immunity,' ' 18 7 it essentially premised the
need for supervision on whether the board was captured-in the per se
or inherent sense-by its own members. Thus, in drawing the line between public and private-made essential by Town of Hallie v. City of
Eau Claire's holding that governmental entities do not need to meet
both Midcal prongs 188-the Court used capture as the touchstone.
Because both administrative law and antitru'st federalism are concerned with capture, it seems reasonable for the Court to use a similar
power sharing model in both contexts, especially if that model could be
tailored to address inherent capture in state regulation. In NC Dental,the
Court has done just that. It has imposed an additional procedural requirement-active supervision by the state itself-where the nominally
governmental regulator is actually a collection of industry members currently competing in the regulated field.
(c) Battling Inherent Capture: The New Regime Imposes CreditBlame Accountability. The way process review works in antitrust federalism-and the particular processes required--differs in significant
ways from administrative law. In the administrative law context, agencies are made accountable by being required to adhere to sometimes
quite numerous and specific procedures. They range from small details
such as keeping a transcript of agency adjudications "9 to onerous obligations like responding adequately to objections raised during the no-

184

NC Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1115 (acknowledging "a long tradition of citizens esteemed by
their professional colleagues devoting time, energy, and talent to enhancing the dignity of
their calling" and "a strong tradition of professional self-regulation").
1'"Id. at 1116 (citing Edlin & Haw, supra note 22).
186 The dissent criticizes the majority on this very point. See id. at 1123 (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority's "capture" test is "crude" and ill-advised).
Id. at 1114 (majority opinion).
188471 U.S. 34 (1985).

189 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 556(e) (2012) (entitling parties to a transcript of evidence that
formed the basis of a decision).
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tice-and-comment period of a rulemaking. 190 These procedures are designed to align agency decision making with congressional intent;'9 1 in
administrative law, the agency is the agent, and Congress is the princi-

pal. 192
Process review in the new antitrust federalism, in contrast, imposes
few and general requirements that are designed to make states accountable to their own voters for the anticompetitive self-regulation they permit. The procedural requirements imposed by the latest cases create a
menu of regulatory options for states: regulate through their sovereign
branches, use disinterested boards, actively supervise self-regulation, or
delegate to self-regulatory groups and accept antitrust scrutiny of their
choices.' 93 The first three options expose state regulation to voter scrutiny by more clearly assigning the state credit and blame for the competitive effects of regulation. These are the carrots, and the last option is the
stick: Where a state fails to make itself accountable for its anticompetitive regulation, federal antitrust law may intervene. This menu encourages accountability of the state to its voters; on this view, the state is the
agent, and the electorate is the principal.
Forcing a state to take more political credit and blame for the anticompetitive regulation it sanctions or tolerates has the potential to mitigate the risks of inherent capture. In theory, if voters represent the diffuse interests of consumers in lower prices, better products and services,
and more innovation, then exposing regulation to electoral discipline
may improve the competitive environment of state-regulated industries.
It may seem na'fve to argue that exposing anticompetitive self-dealing to
the sunshine of electoral politics will actually affect regulatory outcomes, and indeed, it is likely not a perfect solution. Yet there is anecdotal evidence-from the NC Dental case itself-that forcing states to take
credit and blame may result in less anticompetitive regulation than
would occur in a regime of immune, unsupervised industry selfregulation.

190
See Pierce, supra note 121, § 7.4, at 443.
191See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron's Mistake, 58 Duke L.J. 549, 580 (2009) (observing that "[a]dministrative procedures are a mechanism that facilitates legislative monitorinI"?.
Id. at 569-70 (describing the principal-agent relationship between Congress and the
administrative state).
193 See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
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The North Carolina dental board had the option of making a rule
about nondentist teeth whitening,1 94 which could have been even more
effective than the cease-and-desist letters in terms of either stopping
dangerous teeth whitening or suppressing competition. But making such
a rule, under North Carolina law, would have required review by the
state's Rules Review Commission, 195 which would have resulted in more
transparent state involvement in the anticompetitive regulation.196 The
dental board chose the less effective, but more opaque, route to suppressing nondentist teeth whitening probably because they believed the
state, through the Rules Review Commission, would have blocked their
19 7
efforts to, in their own words, "do battle" with the teeth whiteners.
That the state seemed willing to allow the dentists themselves to do what
it was likely unwilling to do in a transparent, accountable manner suggests that credit-blame accountability can help counter the perverse incentives that prompt states to cast the "gauzy cloak" that Midcal warned
against. 98
As an added benefit, process review-by making essential the means
of regulation-operates in the spirit of the Sherman Act. It matters a
great deal for liability under Section One of the Sherman Act how a restraint of trade is created. A restraint created unilaterally, or by parallel
but uncoordinated conduct,' 99 is typically legal under Section One, while
the same restraint created by agreement among competitors can be per

194 See

NC Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1108.

195Id.
196 The

North Carolina Rules Commission is comprised of ten members, appointed by the

State's General Assembly upon recommendation by the President Pro Tempore of the Senate
and Speaker of the House. N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 143B-30.1 (West 2015). The purpose of
the Commission is to review administrative rules in accordance with the state's Administrative Procedure Act. Id. § 143B-30.2. Because there are no statutory requirements for who
may serve and because this ten-person Commission reviews all administrative rules for the
state, it is virtually impossible that for any given rule it reviews it can be said to be inherently captured. Moreover, the Commission has open meetings and publishes minutes, decisions,
and membership online. See Rules Review Commission - Commission Meetings, N.C. Off.
of Admin. Hearings, http://www.ncoah.com/rules/rrc/meetings/index.html. [https://perm
a.cc/UP9X-9R8R].
197
NC Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1108 (quoting Appendix To Petition for Writ of Certiorari at
103a, NC Dental, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (No. 13-534)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
198 Mideal, 445 U.S. at 106.
199See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007) ("A statement of parallel conduct ... needs some setting suggesting the agreement necessary to make out a § 1
claim ...").
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se unlawful. 200 Through its emphasis on credit-blame accountability, the
new antitrust federalism makes essential how regulation is created and
by whom. Like other Sherman Act doctrines, it makes the who and how
crucial to liability.
2. Giving Deference
Cabining the effects of capture is an important goal of the Court in
designing state action immunity. But so too is its interest in deferring to
states' regulatory expertise and idiosyncratic regulatory preferences; the
Court has not yet gone so far as to read federalism out of antitrust federalism. The process review model allows this deference and affords states
some freedom to pursue diverse regulatory approaches. Interestingly, the
reasons for deference in administrative law and antitrust federalism are
different, but the effects-regulatory autonomy for the primary decisionmaker-are similar.
(a) Deference in the Administrative State. When a federal court reviews an agency decision, some deference is due. Chevron deference,
for example, requires courts to defer to an agency's reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute.20 1 Similarly, procedural review of agency
decision
making, even hard-look review, provides agencies with defer2
ence.

20

Courts justify deference to administrative regulation with two categories of arguments. First, agencies have relatively more expertise than
courts; the administrative state concerns itself with highly technical, often scientific areas of regulation, and employs highly expert technocrats
to aid in decision making. 20 3 A lay court second-guessing the product of
such expertise would result in less rational, less effective regulation.
Second, courts review agencies deferentially because courts are per200 See Theater Enters. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540-41 (1954)
(explaining that the same conduct the case finds lawful, if a product of agreement by multiple competitors, would run afoul of the Sherman Act).
201 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)
(holding that agencies must clear two hurdles in defending an interpretation of a statute in
court: First, the agency must show the statute is ambiguous, and second, the agency must
show its interpretation is reasonable).
202 See Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (describing the deference due under what would become known as hard-look review).
203 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (explaining that Congress may choose to delegate interpretive authority to an agency because of its expertise, and since "j]udges are not experts in
the field," it would be inappropriate to second-guess an agency's reasonable interpretation).
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ceived as being less democratically legitimate than agencies, which are
accountable to the electorate, albeit indirectly through the President.2 °4
(b) Deference in Antitrust Federalism. The reasons for deference,

however, are different in antitrust federalism. At a glance, it may seem
possible to map the justifications for deference in administrative lawexpertise and democratic legitimacy-on to the deference afforded by
the new antitrust federalism. But this confuses federalism for its consequences.
It is plausible to say that expertise justifies deference in antitrust federalism because states know more about their particular regulatory challenges and preferences than a federal court. But this justification can
find no support in the case law, and indeed, the Court has always avoid-

ed pointing to practical reasons to defer to state decision making in antitrust federalism cases.20 5 Democratic legitimacy would seem to fit too
because unelected judges second-guessing state regulatory choices
sounds undemocratic. But in antitrust federalism, the democratic legitimacy problem has an additional layer: Searching review by an antitrust
court elevates not only unelected judges but unelected federal judges

over (theoretically) democratically legitimate state choices. And whereas
in the administrative context legitimacy is a reason for deference, 0 6 in
antitrust federalism it is a condition of deference.20 7
The reason for deference in the new antitrust federalism is simpler
and more powerful: The federal courts defer because the state is a state.

This is the "federalism" of the new antitrust federalism. Whether federalism can be justified by appeal to the text of or intent behind the ConstiSee id. at 865-66 (explaining that deference at Chevron's second step is due because
"federal judges-who have no constituency-have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do"); see also Kagan, supra note 118, at 2331-33 (explaining the
democratic legitimacy of agencies running through the President).
205 The dissent in NC Dental underscored this fact when it observed that "[t]he question
before us is not whether such programs serve the public interest." NC Dental, 135 S. Ct. at
1117 (Alito, J., dissenting).
206 Likewise, political illegitimacy is a reason not to defer. See Lisa Schultz Bressman,
Deference and Democracy, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 761, 762-64 (2007) (arguing that although Chevron seems to make deference a matter of course, courts tend to defer only to
agency decisions they view as democratically legitimate). Thus the exceptions-where
courts have failed to defer to an agency's interpretation of the law-prove the rule: Courts
defer to agencies because (and therefore only when) they are democratically legitimate.
207 Cf. Ticor, 504 U.S. at 636 ("States must accept political responsibility for actions they
intend to undertake .... Federalism serves to assign political responsibility, not to obscure
it'").
204
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tution 20 8 °9ororto even
the practical
benefits
that attend
decision
° it is the system
making,
if it cannot
be justified
at all,21decentralized
we
have. Some deference to state decision making-probably even anticompetitive regulation-is required, or at least so the argument goes, for
its preservation. 1 '
Process review preserves the federalism of the new antitrust federalism. It forces a democratic process at the state level, and then accepts the
result without questioning its competitive effects. If exposing inherently
captured regulators to political sunshine does not result in more competition that may mean that a state's voters prefer or are willing to tolerate
the downsides of self-regulation. The federalist approach-one the
Court has not (yet) abandoned-suggests that if voters of a state genuinely prefer one regulatory mode over another, then federalism (and the
benefits it offers to regulatory experimentation,2 2 welfare optimization,2 13 and political engagement 214) is served by a regime that respects
such a choice. On this view, the superior expertise states may bring to
their own regulation and the legitimacy of their regulatory choices are
consequences of-not reasons for-deference by federal antitrust courts.
Deference in the new antitrust federalism has the added benefit of
avoiding charges of Lochnerism, 2 5 even while it puts courts in a strong-

208

See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918-21 (1997) (finding federalist prin-

ciples in the text of the Constitution and in other contemporary writings by the Founders).
09 See Easterbrook, supra note 26, at 34-35 (describing the efficiencies of decentralized
decision making and jurisdictional diversity).
210 See Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 903, 907-09 (1994) (providing a sustained critique of federalism).
211 See Handler, supra note 34, at 17-20 (describing the problems that would ensue with
federal scrutiny of anticompetitive state regulation and concluding "that Parkeris integral to
our federalism... I would not substitute preemption for substantive due process to achieve a
federal censorship of state legislation").
212 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if
its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country."); see also Easterbrook, supra note 26, at 34-35 (describing the value of competition among diverse jurisdictions).
213 See Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders'* Design, 54 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 1484, 1493-94 (1987) (explaining that governmental decentralization optimizes citizen choice).
214 See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 210, at 915-17 (summarizing the argument that federalism encourages political engagement).
215 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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er supervisory role over state regulation.2 16 In the same way that limiting
judicial review of agency decision making to procedure allows federal
courts to avoid accusations of grabbing power from a rival branch,2 17
limiting antitrust review of state decision making to whether the state
took political accountability allows federal courts to avoid accusations
of lightly invalidating state regulation based on a political preference for
free markets. Tying state voter preferences to the question of invalidation is the opposite of Lochner-itputs regulatory authority firmly in the
hands of the state, if "the state" is defined as its voters.
C. Does the Model Go FarEnough?: The UncertainFuture of
Deference
The Court's new antitrust federalism strikes a balance that allows
some deference to state regulatory policy, but that choice is not necessarily inevitable or permanent. Whereas in administrative law, courts
face constitutional barriers to direct substantive review of agency decision making, in antitrust federalism there may be no equivalently strong
barrier to invalidating a state regulation based on its anticompetitive effect because the Parker doctrine rests on statutory interpretation
grounds. 218 Although the Court has never taken this path, the careful
reader will find intonations of substantive review in the Court's antitrust
federalism jurisprudence, and it is a theme that scholars have invoked in
advocating more heavy-handed federal intervention. It may be that if the

216

Antitrust federalism has always operated in the shadow of Lochner. For example, dis-

senting from a state action immunity case exposing liquor regulation to Sherman Act liability, Justice O'Connor accused the majority of a return to "the long-repudiated Lochner v.
New York." 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 359-60 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Furthermore, scholarly comparisons between denials of state action immunity and
Lochnerism abound. See, e.g., John Cirace, An Economic Analysis of the "State-Municipal
Action" Antitrust Cases, 61 Tex. L. Rev. 481, 484 (1982) (noting that "[a]lthough substantive due process was supposedly consigned to oblivion in Ferguson v. Skrupa, it is alive,
well, and traveling incognito in the narrow [antitrust] state action area" (footnote omitted));
Easterbrook, supra note 26, at 24; Garland, supra note 34, at 488; Stephen C. Sherrill, Note,
Parkerv. Brown Revisited: The State Action Doctrine After Goldfarb, Cantor, and Bates, 77
Colum. L. Rev. 898, 931-32 (1977).
217 See Pierce, supra note 121, §2.1, at 35 (noting that "[s]eparation of powers
has.., been invoked to support... the contention that courts cannot review agency policy
decisions").
218
Although the ParkerCourt seemed to invoke constitutional principles of federalism by
appealing to a "dual system of government," Parker, 317 U.S. at 351, it is clear that the
holding of Parkerwas based on a textual interpretation of the Sherman Act. Id.
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new antitrust federalism does not succeed in reining in state rent dealing,
substantive review is next.
1. The Subtext of Substantive Review in the Old Antitrust Federalism
In theory, substantive federal review of the competitive effects of
state regulation could take one of two forms. First, and most simply,
substantive federal review of state regulation would result if the Court
abolished state action immunity altogether, because then all state regulation would be subject to Sherman Act suits. Less dramatically, the Court
could condition state action immunity on whether the state regulation is
intolerably anticompetitive.
For the most part, neither of these models of substantive review has
found much traction with the Court. The Court has mostly maintained at
least an appearance of agnosticism about substance, even of very anticompetitive state regulation, throughout its state action immunity jurisprudence.21 9 Yet there are moments where the mask has slipped. And,
with few exceptions, the Court has managed to find a way to impose
Sherman Act liability for the most egregiously anticompetitive
schemes, 220 suggesting that substance may not be entirely irrelevant to
the Court's state action immunity regime. Finally, the notion of substantive review of state regulation for its competitive effects finds significant
academic support, especially in scholarship from the 1970s. 21
The holding in Parkerseemed to draw a bright line around state activity, regardless of its anticompetitive effect. Indeed, the raisin protectorate program challenged in the case was straightforward price fixing
with very little economic justification beyond dealing rents to the raisin
growers.222 This notion that even extremely anticompetitive state regulation is outside of the Sherman Act's reach-provided that the state is
219

See, e.g., Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. 365 (1991); New Motor

Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 109-10 (1978).
220 See, e.g., Ticor, 504 U.S. 621 (finding no immunity for horizontal minimum price fixing); Goldfarb, 421 U.S. 773 (same). One notable exception is the Court's refusal to create a
bribery exception to its state action immunity doctrine. See Omni Outdoor, 499 U.S. at 374.
221See S. Paul Posner, The Proper Relationship Between State Regulation and the Federal
Antitrust Laws, 49 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 693 (1974); Paul E. Slater, Antitrust and Government Action: A Formula for Narrowing Parkerv. Brown, 69 Nw. U. L. Rev. 71 (1974); Sherrill, supra note 216.
222See Easterbrook, supra note 26, at 27 (explaining that the goal of the raisin program in
Parkerwas to "remedy ... the evils of excessive competition" and "to boost [a] sagging industr[y]").
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truly regulating-has been repeated in state action immunity cases since
Parker. For example, in Ticor, the Court explained that the supervision
requirement exists "not to determine whether the State has met some
normative standard, such as efficiency, in its regulatory practices," but
rather to provide
assurance that "the anticompetitive scheme is the
223
State's own.,
On the other hand, Justices have expressed skepticism about this agnosticism from time to time, although typically not in majority opinions.
For example, Justice Scalia concurred in the result in Ticor, but wrote
separately to note his belief that "state-programmed private collusion,"
however supervised, may not deserve immunity at all.224 Justice Stevens
dissented in a state action immunity case because he advocated a distinction between state regulation of economic activity and state regulation of
"public health, safety, and [the] environment., 225 On his view, immunity
turned on whether the substance of the regulation fell in one category or
the other.226

Some Justices have said that state action immunity is grounded in
federal preemption. According to this perspective, denying immunity is
equivalent to finding that the state-created restriction is preempted by
the Sherman Act.227 Although the opinions do not always acknowledge
it, such a theory of state action immunity implies substantive review of
the state regulation in question because a Supremacy Clause analysis requires determining whether the substance of the state law is in conflict
with or frustrates the purpose of the federal law.228 Such an analysis in
the Sherman Act context would involve a substantive inquiry into the
competitive effects of the state law.
The best illustration of how a preemption theory of antitrust federalism is inherently substantive can be found in Justice Blackmun's fullthroated case for Parker immunity as substantive review. In his concurrence in Cantor,he argued for a "rule of reason" for immunity, explain223 Ticor, 504 U.S. at 634-35.
224 Id. at 641 (Scalia, J., concurring).
225 Omni Outdoor,499 U.S. at 387 (Stevens,
226 Id. at 387, 393-94.

J., dissenting).

227 See Cmty. Commc'ns Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 60 (1982) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); Cantor, 428 U.S. at 605 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
228 See Slater, supra note 221, at 78 (noting that "when [a] state act is in direct conflict
with the policy of a federal act, it should be null and void because of the operation of the supremacy clause of the Constitution" and arguing that such analysis should be applied to determine antitrust immunity).
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ing that "state-sanctioned anticompetitive activity must fall like any other if its potential harms outweigh its benefits., 229 His proposal, grounded
in the notion that state action immunity was justified by federal preemption, envisioned different rules for state regulation and private activity.
For example, he imagined per se legality for "certain kinds of state
en230
actments, such as the regulation of the classic natural monopoly.
Picking up on these mixed signals, several scholars have advocated
substantive review of state regulation before conferring state action immunity. John Shepard Wiley's capture theory of antitrust federalism included a substantive component; one prong of his proposed test for immunity was whether the restriction "directly address[ed] a substantial
market inefficiency., 23' Then-Professor Frank Easterbrook advocated an
immunity test that would inquire into the interstate effects of the restriction and use the Sherman Act to invalidate only those with significant "spillovers. '232 Professor Paul E. Slater presaged Justice
Blackmun's argument in Cantor by advocating state action immunity
that turns on whether the state interest in the regulation outweighed the
federal interest in competition. 3 3 Finally, a student note from 1977 argued that Goldfarb, Cantor, and Bates v. State Bar of Arizona 234 can be
read together as vindicating Professor Slater's and Justice Blackmun's
balancing view. 235
2. Is the New AntitrustFederalism a Step Towards Substantive Review?
Can the Court's new focus on accountability review be read as a step
towards substantive review of anticompetitive state decision making?
Perhaps, although at most that step is small. The Court is clearly concerned about the substance of state regulation, as evidenced especially
by the opinion in NC Dental, where it identified the specific problem of
overregulation of the professions.236 And it has found against state action
immunity in the only two antitrust federalism cases it has decided this
229
23

Cantor, 428 U.S. at 610 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).

1Id. at 611.

231Wiley,

supra note 158, at 713.
232See Easterbrook, supra note 26, at 35, 45.
233 See Slater, supra note 221, at 104-05; see also Posner, supra note 221, at 714-17 (arguing that immunity should turn on whether the regulation is competitively reasonable in light
of the regulatory interest).
234 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
235Sherrill, supra note 216,
236135 S. Ct. at 1116.

at 929-30.
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century. It would be appropriate to conclude that this Court has a healthy
appetite for invalidating anticompetitive state regulation.
But the credit-blame accountability in Phoebe Putney and NC Dental
is a decidedly procedural, nonsubstantive constraint on the states. It may
be justified by a belief that accountability will result in substantively
better regulation, but ultimately, it defers to a state's (politically accountable) choices. If that justification proves weak-if accountability
review cannot restore at least some competition to state-regulated industries-it is possible the Court will abandon its posture of deference and
confront the ghost of Lochner after all.
This Article does not take a stance on whether the abandonment of
deference-and therefore the abandonment of federalism-is inherently
a bad thing, in part because defending a federalist system over a centralized government would require a sustained argument beyond the scope
of this Article. But perhaps even without appeal to first principles, the
Court can be commended for proceeding only incrementally in fashioning the new antitrust federalism. The common law method-by which
almost all antitrust law has been created-works best by incremental
change.237 For this reason alone, perhaps, the new antitrust federalism
and its deference to state regulatory choices ought to be given a fair shot
before resorting to substantive review of state regulation for compliance
with federal competition standards. That fair shot turns on the definition
of "active supervision."
IV. THE FUTURE OF ANTITRUST FEDERALISM:
ACTIVE SUPERVISION

The new antitrust federalism may be able to curb excessively anticompetitive state regulation while preserving the federalism envisioned
in Parker.But as always, the devil is in the details, and the recent cases
are light on those, especially in defining "active state supervision." The
success of the Court's new path-which reviews state activity more
deeply than the boundary-drawing method allowed, yet stops short of
substantive federal review of state regulation-depends on developing a
set of state regulatory procedures that promote genuine jurisdictional diversity without dealing industry a carte blanche. "Active state supervi237 See Rebecca Haw, Delay and Its Benefits for Judicial Rulemaking Under Scientific
Uncertainty, 55 B.C. L. Rev. 331, 354-59 (2014) (arguing that the common law effects legal
change only incrementally, and providing a normative defense of that method).
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sion" should be found only where a politically accountable branch of the
state, acting as supervisor, has identified and attempted to quantify the
competitive effects of the regulatory action.
A. "Active Supervision" So Far

The Supreme Court has not been particularly successful in its attempts to define "active supervision., 238 Of the post-Midcal Supreme
Court cases addressing supervision, three treat the issue only passingly,
including Midcal itself, which decided in a conclusory manner that the
state did not "engage in any 'pointed reexamination' of the rate-setting
program, and so, supervision was lacking. 23 9 The two Supreme Court
cases that have confronted the issue head-on-FTC v. Ticor Title Insurance Co. 240 and Patrick v. Burget 241-- decided that the supervision in
each case was not adequate, leaving little guidance for what state conduct would be considered adequate supervision to meet the second
Midcal prong. The most that emerges from Patrick and Ticor is that supervision must be both substantive (states cannot merely review the procedure used to arrive at anticompetitive regulation) 242 and actively exercised (the supervision must be more than the unexercised ability to
review).243
The Court provided more guidance in NC Dental than it ever had before about the content of "active supervision," but because the case did
not actually present the issue, the discussion is brief and abstract. 24 In
238See

Rosenstein, supra note 15, at 334 (observing that "[d]efining the 'active supervision'
239 requirement... has proven to be problematic").
Midcal, 445 U.S. at 106. Similarly, the majority opinion in 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy,
479 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1987), found supervision lacking, explaining that the regulatory
framework in that case was essentially indistinguishable from that in Midcal: The state authorized private price fixing and did not undertake any review before giving the prices the
force of law. In the only other post-Midcal case to apply the active supervision prong, the
supervision issue was conceded by both parties. See S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc.
v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 62 (1985).
240 504 U.S. 621 (1992).

241 486 U.S. 94 (1988).
242See Patrick,486 U.S. at 102-03 (finding no supervision because "[t]he Health
Division's statutory authority over peer review relates only to a hospital's procedures; that authority does not encompass the actual decisions made by hospital peer-review committees"
(footnote omitted)).
243See Ticor, 504 U.S. at 638 (holding that "[tihe mere potential for state supervision
is
not an adequate substitute for a decision by the State").
244 135 S.Ct. at 1116.
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dicta, the Court outlined the requirements under its preexisting doctrine-that the review be substantive and not merely at the state's unexercised option-and introduced two requirements not previously made
explicit. First, it established that the supervisor must have the right to
"veto or modify particular decisions. '245 Second, the Court explained
that the6 "state supervisor may not itself be an active market partici24
pant."
B. Supervision: Next Steps
The dicta in NC Dental, while not entirely unhelpful, raises more
questions than it answers. First, it is clear that a state supervisor cannot
be an active participant in the regulated market, but who can serve as a
supervisor? Second, although Ticor made it clear that the unexercised
power to review at the state's discretion is not "active supervision," what
about the power to review at an aggrieved party's election? This issue is
essential to the larger question of whether state judicial review could be
considered active supervision. Finally, and perhaps most importantly for
the accountability questions at the heart of the new antitrust federalism,
if the state's review must be substantive, what must that substance be?
Does the state need to consider only the grounds on which the decision
below rests or only those relevant to its articulated state purpose? Or
perhaps must the state explicitly consider competitive consequences as a
part of its review?
1. Who Can Provide "Active Supervision "?
On the one hand, the NC Dental Court's observation that the state supervisor must not itself be a market participant seems tied to the specific
facts of that case-a practitioner-dominated professional licensing board
was seeking immunity without supervision-but it can also be read as
providing a hint about what kind of state entity may serve as a supervisor. Under the old paradigm, an agency, such as a licensing board, may
have been considered "the state itself," and indeed, in 1982 one lower
court held that a state dental board was supervised by the state because it
supervised itself.2 47 Thus, the NC Dental Court's declaration can be read
as indicating that an inherently captured board can no longer bootstrap
Id.
Id. at 1117.
247See Benson v. Ariz. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 673 F.2d 272, 275 (9th Cir. 1982).
245

246
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the supervision requirement by reporting to another version of itself: a
self-interested sub-state entity. That leaves two possible categories of
supervisors: sovereign branches of the state government or sub-state entities that are not so self-interested as to need supervision themselves.
The new antitrust federalism's reliance on accountability review suggests that only politically accountable state entities should be considered
adequate supervisors. If the purpose of supervision is to "assign political
responsibility, 2 48 then the supervisor must be in a position to take political responsibility for its approval, modification, or veto of a regulatory
decision. A state's elected branches-its legislature, its governor, and in
some states its supreme court 49-are most likely to feel the political
heat for anticompetitive regulation through elections. It seems reasonable, therefore, to read NC Dental's requirement that the supervisor not
be an unaccountable market participant as a hint that self-regulation is
only "actively supervised" when one of these sovereign branches of state
government reviews the decisions.
In future "active supervision" cases, the Court should hold that a supervisor must be politically accountable to a state's voters. This requirement is likely to be met when a state uses a committee of its legislature to supervise. 2 ° The legislature, comprised entirely of elected
members, is both visible and accountable to the electorate. If the new antitrust federalism's aim is to hold states accountable for anticompetitive
regulation, then the legislature is the gold standard of accountability. A
committee of the legislature--endowed with the power to review rules
and regulations created by self-regulatory entities before they go into effect-would meet the requirements of "supervisor" and would confer
antitrust immunity with its approval.
Using a legislature as a supervisor presents some possible state constitutional challenges, but they are not insurmountable. If a self-regulatory
board is a "state agency" located under the executive branch, which
many are, then review by a legislative committee arguably establishes a
legislative veto issue similar to that found unconstitutional in the federal
248
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Ticor, 504 U.S. at 636.
In most states, supreme court justices are at least subject to retention elections. See

Methods of Judicial Selection: Selection of Judges, Nat'l Ctr. for St. Cts.,
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial selection/methods/selection ofjudges.cfm?state=
[https://perma.cc/Z8PM-KQF2].
2 0 On this view, the activity of the state bar in Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 574
(1984), would be immune not because, as the case held, the rubber stamp of the state's supreme court was a sovereign act, but because the court supervised the conduct.
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2
Indeed, with one exception, every state to
system in INS v. Chadha.
have considered whether a legislative veto violates its constitution has
adopted the Supreme Court's reasoning in Chadha that all legislationincluding vetoes of agency actions-requires bicameralism and pre2 2 The holding of Chadha, as applied to states, may mean that
sentment. 252
a legislative committee would lack the power to "modify or veto", which
NC Dental requires of supervisors. Connecticut surmounted this problem by amending its constitution in 1982253 to allow its Legislative Regulation Review Committee full pre-enactment veto power.25 4 Similar
state constitutional amendments could be used to replicate Connecticut's
system.
Supervision through the executive branch is perhaps more desirable,
both because it is constitutionally simpler and because it allows the more
efficient use of expertise. There may be trade-offs, however, in terms of
accountability because state executive agencies are politically accountable only indirectly through the governor. Supervision by an executive
agency should pass muster only if it is performed in the harshest possible public light, and with meaningful public participation, while drawing
clear lines of credit and blame back to state governors. As long as such
exposure is ensured, states should feel free to realize the benefits-both
logistical and substantive--of executive review.
Some already do. Many states have rules review commissions located
in their executive branches that may provide starting places for designing "active supervision." For example, Colorado houses many of its executive agencies, including its occupational licensing boards, under the
Department of Regulatory Agencies. 25 5 The Department reviews some of
its sub-boards' rules and decisions using cost-benefit analysis before

251 462 U.S. 919, 956-59 (1983).
252 See Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist Separation of Powers Ideals in the States, 52 Vand. L. Rev. 1167, 1202-03 (1999) (observing that a
legislative veto of the sort at issue in Chadhahas been held unconstitutional in every state to
consider this issue, with the exception of Idaho).
253See
Conn. Gen. Assembly, Legislative Regulation Review Comnittee,
https://www.cga.ct.gov/rr/ [https://perma.cc/8ALW-U5CJ] ("[I]t was a November 24, 1982
amendment to the State's Constitution which provided the authority for the General Assembly to adopt the current structure of the committee.").
254 See id. (explaining that "[i]t is the responsibility of the Legislative Regulation Review
Committee to review regulations proposed by state agencies and approve them before regulations are implemented").
255See What We Regulate, Colo. Dep't of Reg. Agencies, https://www.colorado.g
ov/pacific/dora/node/96181 [https://perma.cc/FJC4-XF9Z].
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implementation.1 6 Economists have applauded this procedure as leading
to less rent dealing and more efficient regulation.25 7 Similarly, Arizona
uses a Regulatory Review Council located in the governor's office to review regulatory activity using cost-benefit analysis. 258 These agencies, if
given statutory authorization to review every rule and endowed with the
power of pre-enactment modification or veto, would suffice as supervisors.
2. May JudicialReview Serve as "Active Supervision"?
Some state courts, such as an elected supreme court, would arguably
meet the requirement that the supervisor be politically accountable. 9
And because judicial review typically allows for a reversal of the reviewed decision, it likely meets the requirement that the supervisor have
the power to "veto or modify" the decision in question.2 60 But does judicial review satisfy the other requirements-that review be substantive
and that review be more than an unexercised option? Although presently
most state judicial review of sub-state entities' decision making is limited to procedural review, 261 there is no reason the judicial standards
could not be made substantive by legislation and meet that requirement
for supervision. But judicial review probably fails to qualify as "active
supervision" because it is by nature an optional process, and so, more
like the power to review-potentially unexercised-that failed to qualify
as supervision in Ticor.26 z
It is possible to argue, however, that there is an important difference
between the negative option in Ticor and judicial review: In Ticor, it
was the state's option to review or leave alone (and thus give the force
of law to) the regulation below, but in the case of judicial review the op-

256 See Colorado's Rulemaking and Cost-Benefit Analysis Process, Colo. Dep't of Reg.

Agencies, https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/dora/node/91146
[https://perma.cc/HUX5HXK7].
257 See Morris M. Kleiner, Reforming Occupational Licensing Policies 17 (The Hamilton
Project,
Discussion Paper No. 2015-01, Jan. 2015).
28
5 See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 41-1052 (2013).
259 See supra note 249.
260NC Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1116.

261 Sub-state regulators are often subject to the state's APA procedural requirements of
transparency and due process, and individuals may bring suit for failure to adhere to those
requirements. See, e.g., North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§ 150B-43 (West 2015) (providing for judicial review at aggrieved party's election).
262 But see Dlouhy, supra note 15, at 419-21.
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tion lies with the aggrieved party. On this view, it is perhaps less problematic to consider a state's unexercised potential for judicial review to
be "active supervision" because if an antitrust plaintiff is in a position to
argue that the state court did not review the decision, that plaintiff must
not have exhausted his state remedies. In such a circumstance, Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp argue, "we would be concerned about the
challenger's wish to use the antitrust laws in lieu of a state procedure
that seems adequate to the purpose. 26 3
The new antitrust federalism, however, and its emphasis on clear lines
of political responsibility for anticompetitive regulation, suggest that judicial review at the election of an aggrieved party is not "active supervision." If judicial review were sufficient, then the state would only have
to take full responsibility for its regulation in those circumstances where
an injured party is sufficiently organized, informed, funded, and motivated to bring suit. This leaves clarifying the lines of accountability to
the whim of individual plaintiffs, and would likely allow the state, in
many circumstances, to circumvent the Sherman Act without taking the
heat for doing so. So while the argument that judicial review is a negative option has a plausible rejoinder, the fact that judicial review does
little to clarify the lines of political accountability means it is likely not
an adequate means of state supervision.2 6
3. What is the "Substance" of Substantive Review?
When the Court said in NC Dental that the review must be "substantive," but failed to elaborate on that substance, it defined adequate supervision only negatively: "substantive," in this context, meant "not pro263 1 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law 221, at 380 (2d ed. 2000).
Areeda and Hovenkamp therefore conclude that "the realistic availability of supervision to
anyone requesting it should count as adequate supervision." Id. 221, at 381.
A difficult case is raised by whether adjudicative acts-such as denying an individual a
professional license-can be supervised by a state's courts through lawsuits. On the one
hand, adjudicative decisions can have anticompetitive consequences just like rules and regulations and ought to be subject to a similar supervisory requirement. On the other hand, because the individual involved in the adjudication does have the kind of personal stake necessary to bring suit, state court review of adjudicatory decisions will in a practical sense force
more accountability than would judicial review of rules. And it seems far-fetched to expect
meaningful engagement with every individual licensing decision by a legislative committee
or umbrella agency located within the executive. Pragmatism probably dictates that the
availability of state court remedies-provided they are substantive and not, as currently is
the case in most states, procedural-should suffice as state supervision for individual adjudications.
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cedural. ' '265 The process behind a decision has a relatively concrete
meaning, in part because of the familiarity of administrative law. To a
legal audience, inquiring into the "process" behind a decision invokes a
specific set of questions: Who was consulted? How were arguments presented? Who made the decision? Was there an appeal process? Was the
decision making public? Was it on or off the record? Was it conducted
in an adversarial manner? But the substance of a decision is a limitless
set; it is all the reasons a decision was or could have been made-all the
possible justifications, whether articulated or unarticulated-behind a
regulatory choice.
To answer this more difficult question of what the Court meant by
substantive review, we can look for hints in the cases addressing active
supervision, but doing so requires reading between the lines. NC Dental
explained that substantive review was necessary to attribute a delegated
decision to the state itself. The majority opinion explained that the clear
articulation prong alone cannot "resolve the ultimate question whether
an anticompetitive policy is indeed the policy of a State .... for a policy
may... be defined at so high a level of generality as to leave open critical questions. ,,266 Supervision, the Court explained, must address the "interstitial policies made by the entity claiming immunity. '' 26 1 And itfound
supervision necessary when the state used a competitively risky way to
regulate, through delegation to active industry members. 268 Because the
special risk of self-regulation, or inherent capture, is that "interstitial
policies" will suppress competition to the advantage of industry, it follows that supervision should directly address the competitive effects of
the reviewed regulation.
Likewise, the holding in Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire-that
269 municipalities need not be supervised to enjoy antitrust immunity
comports with the notion that supervision exists to ensure competitively
reasonable regulation. In that case, the Court justified the shortcut for
municipalities by explaining that "[w]here the actor is a municipality,
there is little or no danger that it is involved in a private price-fixing arrangement., 270 Later, in Patrick,the Court reiterated this rationale be265 135 S. Ct. at 1116-17.
2

66Id. at 1112.

267Id.

161
Id.at 1114.
269
471 U.S. 34, 46 (1985).
270 Id. at 47 (emphasis omitted).
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hind the supervision requirement, by demanding that the supervision
provide "realistic assurance that a private party's anticompetitive conduct promotes state policy, rather than merely the party's individual interests. 27 The "private price-fixing" and "individual interests" at stake
in Hallie and Patrick are, at bottom, competition problems. The Hallie
Court seemed to believe that the local political accountability of a city
would limit anticompetitive municipal regulation; whereas the Court believed the self-interest among the regulating physicians in Patrick required state supervision.
The "substance" of substantive review should include an inquiry into
the competitive effects of the restriction. The state, in its supervisory
role, must ensure not only that the sub-state entity's decision comports
with state policy, but also that it comports with the state's policy to displace competition. Only when the state openly acknowledges the anticompetitive effects of a regulatory decision it has authorized and
claimed as its own will the proper assignment of blame be clear and effective. And this acknowledgement must require more than a statement
that anticompetitive results are possible or likely. In order to truly adopt
the regulation as its own, the state should attempt to identify and quantify the competitive effects that will result from the sub-state regulation.
Of course, hard data on these points is preferable,2 72 but where it is not
available, economic theory can at least estimate the types and seriousness of the effects.
The requirement that states, when supervising industry selfregulation, estimate competitive effects has an analogy in the administrative state. The National Environmental Policy Act requires regulators
to prepare environmental impact statements when pursuing projects potentially impacting the environment.273 These disclosures are not neces271Patrick,486 U.S. at 101.
272Where quantitative data is available, or can be imported from an analogous field of

regulation, it should be used to estimate the competitive effects.
7342 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006). John Shepard Wiley, Jr. considered-but rejectedadding to his "capture" test for state action immunity a prong requiring such competitive impact statements. See Wiley, supra note 158, at 744. His reasons for rejecting the prong-that
the statements are easily manipulated and the success of environmental impact statements
("EIS") in the administrative context has been dubious-are not to be ignored. Id. at 744-45
n.147. But this Article argues for competitive impact statements, not as a condition of immunity, but as a condition of supervision, meaning that the state as supervisor, and not the
self-regulator, would have the final word on the statements. The state is more visible and accountable than the entity usually trying to claim immunity, and so Wiley's skepticism is not
necessarily on point here.
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sarily required to conform to a substantive standard of environmental
2 74

impact, but serve to make any anticipated effects publically known.
These disclosures are most effective in reducing environmental harm in
contexts where there is a well-organized public interest presence that can
be counted on to raise objections.275 State regulation may be just such a
context, with organizations, like the Institute for Justice,276 acting as
watchdogs against competitively harmful state regulation.
States may demand that the sub-state regulatory entity perform a
competitive impact analysis in the first instance, but to qualify as active
supervision, the state's review of reports prepared by industry members
should not be deferential. De novo review of all aspects of the entity's
decision, including competitive impact, is required to ensure that supervised regulation is "the state's own., 2 7 7 If inherently captured regulators
pose a high risk of self-dealing, then they cannot be expected to be impartial in estimating economic impact or alignment with state policy.
Deference to such regulators is also inappropriate because deference
blurs the lines of political accountability that the new antitrust federalism is designed to sharpen. Rather, if a state chooses to regulate by delegating to industry itself, then electorally accountable state actors should
be required to explicitly communicate to voters the cost of such regulation to consumers.
Some states already perform a competitive impact analysis, or something similar to it, when reviewing agency regulation. Many executive
commissions or legislative committees tasked with reviewing administrative rules include cost-benefit analysis as a part of their review,278
274

The hope, of course, is that disclosure would lead to more competitively reasonable

regulations. Some argue that environmental impact statements, by forcing disclosure of negative effects, have improved the environmental effects of government regulation. See Wesley A. Magat & Christopher H. Schroeder, Administrative Process Reform in a Discretionary
Aqe: The Role of Social Consequences, 1984 Duke L.J. 301, 320.
See Wiley, supra note 158, at 745 n.148 (implying that whatever success the EIS
movement had was due to "legally and scientifically well-endowed environmental interest
groups" (quoting Serge Taylor, Making Bureaucracies Think: The Environmental Impact
Statement Strategy of Administrative Reform 309 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitteN.The Institute for Justice, currently rebranding itself as the National Law Firm for Liberty, is a law firm dedicated to vindicating economic freedom by challenging, among other
things, state-level laws that stifle competition. See About Us, Inst. for Justice,
http://ij.org/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/A9QT-KSE5].
7Ticor, 504 U.S. at 634-5.
278See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 41-1052 (2013); Colorado's Rulemaking and CostBenefit Analysis Processes, supra note 247.
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which should include an appraisal of the regulation's impact on competition. Arizona actually requires agencies to prepare impact statementswhich are searchingly reviewed-along with their proposed regulations. 279

This requirement may seem to run afoul of language from Ticor,
which explained that "the purpose of the active supervision inquiry is
not to determine whether the State has met some normative standard,
such as efficiency, in its regulatory practices., 280 But the requirement
that a state identify and attempt to quantify competitive effects is not
equivalent to requiring that a particular standard be met. The identification of competitive effects would serve to make clear who is to blame
for unpopular regulation and who should be credited with efficient regulation. But states would remain free to apply their own standards when
trading off competitive effects for regulatory benefits, and substantive
Sherman Act standards-such as the rule of reason requirement that
competitive benefits outweigh costs-need not play a role in establishing whether supervision was adequate. Nor is such a requirement tantamount to a requirement that the state use good governance in its regulation.28' It would merely ensure that the state was clear with its citizens
that the estimated anticompetitive effects were intended, or at least tolerated, by the state itself.
To be sure, when the state regulates as sovereign, for example
through statutes, there is no requirement-as a matter of antitrust law or
constitutional law-that the state consider or even acknowledge the
competitive effects of its regulation before receiving antitrust immunity. 282 But direct regulation by a state legislature carries a far lesser risk
of competitive harm than delegated self-regulation. While states certainly do have the power to regulate as sovereign without reference to competition, they do not have the power to hand the reins of competition
See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 41-1052.
Ticor, 504 U.S. at 634-35 (observing that the supervision requirement ought not to
"question... how well state regulation works but whether the anticompetitive scheme is the
State's own").
281See City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 376-78 (1991).
282Acts of the sovereign are per se immune from antitrust liability, see Bates v. State Bar
of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 357 (1977) (citing In re Bates, 555 P.2d 640, 643 (Ariz. 1976)), and
attempts to invalidate economically inefficient state statutes under the Due Process Clause
have, for the most part, failed, see, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S.
483, 487 (1955) (upholding an anticompetitive law even though it "may exact a needless,
wasteful requirement in many cases").
279
280
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over to industry itself, and then ignore the obvious risk of competitive
harm while immunizing such self-interested regulation from a Sherman
Act challenge.283
CONCLUSION

It is common to observe that since Garciav. San Antonio Metro, there
are no judicially-enforced boundaries between federal and state power.
Federalism, in other words, is dead. 284 But in fact, judicially-enforced
federalism-lurking behind an obscure and technical area of law known
as state action antitrust immunity-is very much alive. For most of the
last century, the Court quietly tinkered away with the contours of this
federalism, struggling under the false formalism of a discernable boundary between state regulation and private cartels. But with the Court's last
three antitrust cases, the tinkering has given way to reformation.
What used to be a doctrine with deep roots in constitutional federalism-the sort now declared "dead"-is now a doctrine with close ties to
the federal administrative state where courts sit in judgment of an agency's procedure. The change is a welcome one, both because the old antitrust federalism was unworkable and because the new regime of accountability review addresses the inherent capture at the heart of modem
state regulation, while affording some deference to state regulatory
choices. Accountability review mitigates the risk of delegated selfregulation while retaining some deference-without which antitrust federalism would not be federalism at all.
The success of the new regime depends on how the Court defines its
requirement that states "actively supervise" self-regulation or else expose it to antitrust challenge. The Court should only find "active supervision" where the state's politically accountable actors have taken transparent responsibility, not only for the regulation in general, but also for
its specific anticompetitive effects. Without giving accountability review
such bite, states will continue to selectively repeal the Sherman Act in
the guise of self-regulation. If the new antitrust federalism fails to rein in
the self-dealing epitomized by the current state of professional licensing,
283

The NC Dental Court made a similar point when it observed that the states' greater

power to regulate anticompetitively through their own sovereign branches without federal
antitrust liability does not include "the lesser power to negate the congressional judgment
embodied in the Sherman Act through unsupervised delegations to active market participants." 135 S. Ct. at 1111.
284 See sources cited supra note 145.
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for example, the Court may be forced to take a heavier hand against the
states and sacrifice federalism at the altar of competition. But abandoning the federalism of antitrust federalism is strong medicine; better to
give the new antitrust federalism a fighting chance and save its obliteration for another day.

